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Abstract
Graphical passwords, like the Android Pattern Lock, are a popular security
mechanism for mobile devices. The mechanism was proposed as an alternative to
text-based passwords, since psychology studies have recognized that the human brain
have a superior memory for remembering and recalling visual information.
This thesis aims to explore the hypothesis that human characteristics influence users’
choice of graphical passwords. A collection of 3393 user-created patterns were
analysed in order to examine the correlation between people’s choice of pattern and
their characteristics, like hand size, age, gender and handedness.
This thesis first gives a detailed summary of related research on graphical passwords.
Then it shows how an online survey was used for collecting user-selected passwords
and information about the respondents. Lastly, the thesis explains how the data was
analysed in terms of length and visual complexity in order to gain further insight in
users’ choice of passwords.
Although the data could not provide significant evidence to accept the hypothesis, the
results show that password strength significantly varies between gender, age and IT
experience. Additionally, analysis of all the collected patterns shows a significant bias
towards the selection of pattern starting position.

Sammendrag
Grafiske passord, som Android Pattern Lock, er en populær sikkerhetsmekanisme for
mobile enheter. Mekanismen var foreslått som et alternativ til tekstbaserte passord,
siden studier innen psykologi har vist at menneskehjernen er overlegen når det gjelder
å huske og å gjenkjenne visuelle inntrykk.
Denne masteroppgaven har som mål å utforske hypotesen som påstår at menneskelige
karakteristikker påvirker brukeres valg av passord. En samling av 3393
brukeropprettede passord ble analysert for å undersøke om det finnes en korrelasjon
mellom menneskers valg av passord og deres karakteristikker, som håndstørrelse, alder,
kjønn og håndpreferanse.
Masteroppgaven gir først en detaljert gjennomgang av relatert forskning om grafiske
passord. Deretter viser den hvordan en spørreundersøkelese på internett ble brukt for
å samle inn brukervalgte passord sammen med informasjon om innsenderne. Til slutt
beskriver oppgaven hvordan lengde og visuell kompleksitet på mønstrene ble analysert
for å oppnå en dypere forståelse av brukernes valg av grafiske passord.
Selv om dataene ikke kunne gi signifikante bevis for å akseptere hypotesen, viser
resultatene at passordstyrken varierer betydelig mellom kjønn, alder og IT-erfaring.
I tillegg viser analyse av alle innsamlede mønstre at det er en skjevfordeling i hvilke
noder som blir brukt som startnoder.
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1 | Introduction
Mobile devices play a significant role in our everyday life. In the last decade, mobile
phones have improved in terms of capability, interaction and context of use. Mobile
phones are no longer only a tool for simple communication, but also a tool for paying
bills, reading email and keeping up with social media. Due to the large amount of
sensitive data stored on the devices, there is an increased need for security, which
makes mobile authentication an important topic for research.
Screen locks are used as a protection mechanism to prevent sensitive information
leakage from mobile devices. Historically, screen locking mechanisms were developed
to avoid accidental use, for instance if the device was carried in a pocket. Today, the
goal is information protection, and the locks have evolved into mechanisms like PIN
codes, fingerprints, pattern locks and passwords. However, the problem with these
mechanisms are threefold: First, people find it hard to remember a long and secure
password. Second, long, text-based passwords can be troublesome to input on a small
touch screen. Third, the use of more complex locking mechanisms means more time
spent unlocking the device, which is especially disadvantageous if the device is used
frequently.
Passwords are often user-selected secrets which are connected to that user as a
person. When creating an alphanumeric password, people tend to use associations
to something they know, are, or recognize; passwords are more than just arbitrary
words and numbers. Examples of this are people who use their date of birth as their
PIN, or their favorite sports team as their password. This kind of predictability makes
alphanumeric passwords less secure and illustrates one of the main shortcomings of
using these for authentication.
Because of the shortcomings with alphanumeric passwords [25], there is an increased
interest in graphical passwords. Graphical passwords were proposed as an alternative
to PINs and alphanumeric input because humans in general remember graphical
elements better than letters and numbers [12]. This method is a promising alternative
to alphanumeric passwords, as it offers better usability and helps the user creating
complex passwords that are easy to remember. The smartphone is a well-suited platform
for graphical passwords because the touch screen allows for intuitive manipulation of
graphical elements. This is easier than typing letters and numbers.
One of the commonly used graphical password mechanisms is the Android Pattern Lock
which was introduced on the Android platform by Google in 2008. The Android Pattern
Lock enables the user to connect dots in a 3×3 grid, forming a pattern. Compared
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to PIN codes, which have 10.000 unique combinations, the Android authentication
mechanism allows for 389.112 possible combinations. However, this number is only
the theoretical password space. In 2013, a research group conducted the first large-
scale user study on the Android Pattern Lock where 2900 user-selected patterns were
collected and analyzed [39]. They found bias in the pattern-making process and
claimed that the password space in practice is less than the theoretical.
However, not many researchers have studied the correlation between human character-
istics and choice of patterns. As previously mentioned, PINs are biased towards birth
dates and passwords have a higher probability of being the person’s favorite sports
team. Can any similar behavior be found in graphical passwords? Can your choice of
pattern be connected to you as a person?
1.1 Hypothesis and Research Questions
Based on preliminary work [26], the following null(H0) and alternative(H1) hypotheses
were chosen:
H0: Human properties have no influence on a user’s choice of
graphical passwords
H1: A user’s choice of graphical passwords is influenced by
the human properties of the user
In order to test and further investigate these hypotheses, the following research
questions were chosen:
RQ1: Is there a correlation between age and choice of graphical passwords?
RQ2: Is there a correlation between gender and choice of graphical passwords?
RQ3: Is there a correlation between handedness and choice of graphical passwords?
RQ4: Is there a correlation between experience with IT and security and choice of
graphical passwords?
RQ5: Is there a correlation between reading orientation and choice of graphical
passwords?
RQ6: Is there a correlation between handsize and choice of graphical passwords?
RQ7: Are there any similarities in the choice of graphical passwords in the entire
population?
RQ8: Is the choice of graphical passwords determined by its context of use?
The selected human properties stated in RQ1 through RQ6 are closely related to the
overall goal; answering the hypotheses. A detailed review of the human characteristics
included in the six first research questions is provided in Section 3.3. RQ7 and RQ8
are a result of the selected research design selected in the preliminary work for this
dissertation [26]. It may be useful to have an overall understanding of the population
to be able to see whether an observation relates to a distinct subgroup or the entire
population in general. The data collection will introduce three contexts of using a
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pattern, making it interesting to see whether the context of use impacts the choice in
patterns as described in RQ8.
1.2 Methodology
This section provides an overview of the methods used for conducting this research.
The first part contains the literature study, providing an overview of published research
and related theory relevant to this research. The second and third part contains the
research design and analysis of collected data.
1.2.1 Literature Study
The literature study was performed to place the work in this dissertation in a context of
research that has already been published. This study used sources that are considered
to be of high quality, as well as being through sufficient reviews and quality controls
by an external review board. This study considered ACM [1], IEEE [23], and Springer
[33] as highly rated journals in information systems and computing. In addition to
journal articles, sources like books and conference papers have been used. Due to lack
of quality control of content on web pages, the use of content from web pages was
avoided when possible.
Conducting a literature study is challenging work due to the massive amount of
literature available. Keywords listed in Table 1.1 were put together with logical
operators like OR and AND to build a query for narrowing the search for literature.
Whenever literature satisfying a high level of quality was found, the reference list was
further utilized as a source for exploring new and relevant research.
Android Pattern lock Graphical password
Passwords Usability Security
Authentication Mobile authentication Mobile security
Human factors Psychology Visual Memory
Table 1.1: Keywords used to narrow the search for literature
When finding literature matching the keywords, a specific order for reading the
literature was used for reading the literature to be able to determine its relevance
and quality. Firstly, it was preferable to look at the abstract first as it often includes
important information about the research objectives, the methods used, and the results.
Secondly, if the abstract was promising, the result, discussion, and methodology were
studied. Lastly, if the research was very interesting, the whole publication was studied
from the start to the end. Table 1.2 is a list of quality criterias that was created as a
checklist to be used while reading published research.
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# Quality Criteria
QC 1 The research is published in a known digital library, journal or
conference.
QC 2 There is a clear statement of the aim of the research.
QC 3 The study is cited by other researchers.
QC 4 There is a clear description of the method used in the study.
QC 5 If the research includes an experiment, user study, or other research
strategies, there should be a reasonable sample size used.
Table 1.2: Quality criteria for literature review
1.2.2 Data Collection
In order to answer the hypotheses, an online survey was used for collecting patterns
and information about the respondents. The need for large amounts of data makes an
online survey a suitable method because it simplifies the data collection process, as
well as making it possible to reach people living in different geographical locations.
The survey was designed to use a self-selection sampling technique [28], meaning that
anyone who wants to participate may answer. The self-selection sampling technique
also supports the requirements of anonymity where no overview of respondents exists.
Chapter 3 will present a detailed description of the survey design, including the
questions asked, and the structure of the survey.
1.2.3 Data Analysis
Before starting the analysis of the collected data, the data set were preprocessed and
validated to obtain results of high quality that can be used to answer the hypotheses.
The data were also preprocessed before they were used to avoid including outlines or
data including noise in the data. The process of validating and preprocessing the data
is further described in Section 5.4.
After obtaining a validated and preprocessed data set, the data are presented as results
in Chapter 5. The results examine the patterns created by the different user types
as listed in the list of research questions. All the patterns produced by the various
user types are analyzed in terms of creation time, length, and visual complexity. For
pattern length and visual complexity, a t-test are performed for tesing for significant
differences in the created patterns. In addition to creation time, length, and visual
complexity, other observations may be presented in the result chapter if interesting
results are found.
The validity of the results are evaluated by performing a two-tailed t-test with a
significance level of 0.5. The t-test can be used to see if there is a significant difference
in the patterns created by the different user types.
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1.3 Thesis Structure
Chapter 2: Related Work on Graphical Passwords An introduction to the
related work and theory published on graphical passwords and mobile authentication.
Chapter 3: Data Collection Presents the research design in detail and describes
the process of collecting data in detail.
Chapter 4: A Detailed Descripton of the Survey Presents the survey application,
including the resquirements, desciption of how the survey works and how it looks.
Chapter 5: Results Presents the results observed by analyzing the collected data.
The results are presented according to the stated research questions.
Chapter 6: Discussion A discussion of the results found according to the stated
research questions. The discussion will further be a basis for the conclusion.
Chapter 7: Conclusion and Future Work Presents the conclusion; acceptance or
rejection of the hypotheses. This section will also provide a conclusion of the listed
research questions. The section for future work provides suggestions for further work
based on the results form this research.
5
6
2 | Background Theory and Re-
lated Work
This chapter looks into the background theory needed for futher reading this thesis,
as well as providing an insigh to related work. The chapter starts with Section 2.1,
providing an overview of the shortcomings with text-based passwords; the origin of
graphical passwords. Section 2.2 looks at graphical passwords from a historical point of
view. When did it all start, and where are we now? The section describes and visualises
graphical passwords schemes proposed over the past years until today. Section 2.3
are looking at research evaluating different graphical password schemes from usability
and security point of view. Section 2.4 looks at graphical passwords focusing on the
human aspects of security, as well as introducing some material from psychology. As
mobile devices is a crucial part of our daily lives, Section 2.5 are looking into graphical
passwords and mobile devices. At last, Section 2.6 looks particularly into one of the
most commonly used graphical passwords schemes on mobile devices; the Android
Pattern Lock.
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2.1 Shortcomings of Text-Based Authentication
User authentication is a central part of security systems. Despite the extensive
number of options for authentication, text-based passwords remain the most common
authentication scheme. Text-based authentication is the authentication scheme widely
adopted because it is easy and inexpensive to implement, and users are familiar with
the scheme. Text-based authentication also avoids the privacy issues raised by the
use of biometric authentication, as well as preventing the need for a physical security
device used in token-based authentication schemes. However, text-based authentication
suffers from both security and usability disadvantages. As users need to remember an
increasing number of passwords, users adopt bad password habits. The term habit is
often a bad thing when talking about security. A habit is often hard to change and is
often predictable because it tends to occur in similar situations repeatedly.
Password reuse is one of the known password habits among users, caused by human
limitations for being able to remember text-based passwords.Another habit introduced
as a cause of dealing with the problem of remembering passwords is to create short and
meaningful passwords that are easier to remember. However, a consequence of creating
short passwords is a vulnerability for brute-force attacks, introducing a security risk.
Furthermore, having an expanding number of accounts requires users to manage a set
of different passwords across multiple devices. The problem is not just to remember
all the required passwords, but also to remember which passwords belong to which
account or device. The increased number of accounts and devices is an another cause
for users to reuse passwords across multiple accounts and devices.
One of the first large-scale studies on web password habits was conducted in 2007 by
Microsoft Research [17]. They analyzed text-based passwords used by 544.960 Internet
users over a period of 3 months. In order to collect the passwords, Microsoft used a
Windows Live Toolbar observing activities like login frequency. They were also able
to observe how many unique passwords each user had and how the passwords were
used across separate URLs. Microsoft observed that a typical user has an average of
7 distinct passwords. Out of the seven unique passwords, five of them were re-used
on different web pages. An estimate of the average number of accounts per user was
estimated to 25 accounts per user.
Password schemes have what is called a theoretical password space that is the number
of possible combinations of passwords that a user can make. Research has reported
that when creating passwords, users to not utilize the entire password space, but uses
only a subset of the conceivable password combinations. The password space in use
can be seen as the practical password space, making the practical password space less
than the theoretical password space (Figure 2.1). The selected passwords show that
the security of a password scheme relates to its practical password space rather than
its theoretical password space.
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Figure 2.1: Theoretical password space vs. Password space in practice
In a case study of 14.000 Unix passwords, a research group found that 25% of the
passwords were a group of words forming a dictionary of 3 × 106 words [25]. This
dictionary shows that an attacker can have a relatively high success rate for an attack,
despite the fact that there are roughly 2× 1014 8-character passwords consisting of
digits, and upper and lower case letters. As a result of people choosing weak passwords
that are easier to remember, a significant number of user-chosen passwords falls into a
small dictionary, e.g. the password space in practice [35]. A well-designed dictionary is
considered to be a tiny subset of the full password space, e.g. the theoretical password
space, which further may be prioritized according to the likelihood for a password to
be chosen. It is, therefore, commonly stated that the security of a password scheme is
related to the size of its password space in practice, rather than its theoretical password
space. The high success rate of dictionary attacks against text-based passwords is
considered to be a significant cause of the recall capabilities of humans and how they
choose their passwords.
As a result of the shortcomings of text-based authentication, graphical authentication
is getting increased attention as an alternative to text-based authentication. Graphical
passwords are attempting to help the users to be able to create secure passwords
that are also easy to remember. Instead of consisting of text and numbers, graphical
passwords make use of images and visual objects in the authentication process. When
comparing the use of text against the use of visual objects, the human brain is more
capable of remembering images than text [12]. As a consequence of humans being more
capable of recognizing images, users will be more capable of creating more complicated
passwords that are harder to guess.
The next section will look further into the history of graphical passwords; when did it
all start and what does the situation look like today?
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2.2 The History of Graphical Passwords
This section will look at related work on graphical passwords from a historical point
of view. The graphical password schemes reviewed will provide an elaboration of how
the scheme works as well as a graphical illustration of its design
Since it all started around 1996, there have been many suggestions for graphical
password schemes. When proposing a new password scheme, there are several aspects
of the scheme that needs to be considered. A password scheme needs to be secure in
terms of entropy, and it needs to be hard to guess, as well as being intuitive to use. The
history of graphical passwords is important to know because each scheme is attempts
to improve various aspects of an earlier proposed scheme. A detailed understanding of
today’s situation can be understood by studying graphical passwords from a historical
point of view. The review starts by looking at where the first graphical passwords
originated from, ending up looking at today’s situation some of the newly proposed
schemes.
Greg Blonder initially described the idea of graphical passwords in a patent published
in 1996 [6]. The graphical password scheme proposed was requiring the user to touch on
a predefined set of points on an image to pass the authentication process. The patent
was just a proposal and did not further explore the power of graphical passwords, nor
did it analyze the security aspects of the patent. Figure 2.2(a) is an illustration from
Blonder’s patent of the first graphical password scheme.
(a) Proposal for a graphical pass-
word scheme[6]
(b) DAS [24] (c) BDAS [15]
In 1999, Jermyn et al. [24] suggested a new graphical password scheme called Draw-a-
Secret (abbreviated DAS). DAS was the first recall-based graphical password scheme
proposed. The motivation for the DAS was that graphical input devices enabling
the user to decouple the position of inputs from the temporal order in which they
occur. The decoupling can be used to generate passwords that increased the size of the
password space in practice. In order to make a more memorable password, the research
group argued that the DAS was more secure than text-based passwords because the
users were able to remember longer and more complex passwords. After the DAS
scheme was published, Dunphy and Yan [15] added an extra background image to the
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DAS and named it "Background DAS" (BDAS). The thought of adding a background
to the DAS was to encourage their users to make more complex passwords. Dunphy
and Yan believed that the additional image would support the users to remember
longer and more complex passwords, and therefore stating that the BDAS was more
secure than DAS. Figure 2.2(b) and Figure 2.2(c) are showing images of the DAS and
the BDAS respectively.
In 2000, Dhamija and Perrig [13] created a new password scheme called Deja Vu. Deja
Vu creates its visual content from the hash visualization technique [29], a technique
that replaces meaningless strings with structured images. The images end up looking
like random art as a result of the hash visualization technique that turns the bits of a
meaningless string into an image. Dhamija and Perrig wanted to make a graphical
password scheme that solved some of the shortcomings with recall-based authentication
like PINs and text-based passwords. A recall-based authentication scheme is a scheme
with the characteristics of something you know. Dhamija and Perrig designed Deja
Vu for purely relying on recognition rather than recall, as well as being hard to write
down and share with other people. The images used in Deja Vu makes it hard to
share a password because the images are hard to recreate, as well as being easy to
remember. Instead of writing art on a grid, the users were asked to select a sequence
of images from a random set of images that are generated by the hash visualization
technique. The property of being hard to recreate, as well as being easy remember,
assists the users in avoiding the habit of writing down the passwords. Figure 2.2(e)
are showing the Deja Vu scheme using the hash visualization technique for creating
images from random strings looking like random art.
(d) Passfaces [30] (e) DejaVu [13]
Passfaces is a graphical password scheme developed by Real User Corporation founded
in 2000 [30]. The Passfaces scheme asks the user first to select four images that are
a visualization of human faces. The four faces selected represent the password, and
the user is authenticated by identifying them. The selected faces are shown together
with eight other faces not initially included in the set of the preselected faces. The
scheme exploits the advantage that people are good at recognizing other people, so
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when users select the human faces they can use the characteristics of the faces in the
process of remembering their password. Passfaces are quite similar to the previously
described Deja Vu scheme. The most significant difference between the schemes is
that they make use of different association elements in the images, faces, and random
art. Figure 2.2(d) illustrates the PassFaces scheme used on a smartphone. Passfaces is
one of the few graphical password schemes with a commercial success.
Passdoodle was a new scheme first purposed by Goldberg et al. in 2002 and later
studied by Varenhorst in 2004 [19, 42]. Passdoodle is similar to DAS, but allows users
to create a freehand drawing as a password, and uses a more complex matching process
without the visible grid. To add variability to the doodles, additional characteristics
like color, drawing speed, and number of pen strokes, have been suggested. Figure
2.2(h) is an example of a freehand drawn doodle.
In 2004, Davis et al. did a comparison of a light version of PassFace and a new
graphical password scheme called Story [11]. The Story scheme is making the users
choosing images to make up a story instead of just recalling a set of faces. The Story
scheme was created to help users remember their passwords by making a memorable
story of images. For users to pass the authentication process, the story had to be
recalled in the correct order. For supporting memorability, users were instructed to
construct a story mentally to connect the everyday images in the set. Figure 2.2(f) is
an image of Story scheme demonstrating the images of objects used to create a story.
In 2005 Wiedenbeck et al. proposed a graphical password scheme called PassPoints
[47]. PassPoints is an extension of Blonder’s [6] scheme by eliminating the constraints
and allowing arbitrary images to be used. They evaluated their password scheme
by testing the scheme for human users. The results showed that PassPoint was a
promising scheme with respect to memorability because of the low error rate and low
clicking rate. The aim of this study was to gain an understanding of how different
images affected user performance in authentication with a graphical password scheme.
The preliminary result showed suggested that images may support memorability in
graphical password schemes. Figure 2.2(g) is an image of the PassPoints scheme.
(f) Story [11] (g) PassPoints [47]
In 2006, a research group wanted to address the problem with graphical passwords
and the shoulder surfing problem. They called their password scheme Convex Hull
Click (abbreviated CHC) [49]. CHC allows the user to use the scheme in secure and
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insecure locations because users do not directly click on the images in the password.
This design makes it hard for attackers to perform a shoulder surfing attack. CHC
has a display of small icons. In the authentication process, the user must recognize
some minimum number of their chosen images, or pass-icons, out of a vast number of
randomly placed icons. If the user responds correctly every time in the correct order,
the user will pass the authentication. Figure 2.2(i) is a picture of the CHC scheme
with three selected icons.
(h) Hand-written Passdoodle [42] (i) CHC [49]
In 2007, Tao and Adams [35] designed the graphical password schemePass-Go. The
motivation for creating the Pass-Go scheme was to avoid the problem of failing to
be able to accurately recreate the drawing as observed in DAS. Pass-Go reduced the
problem by using grid intersection points instead of grid cells as used in DAS. The users
movements are captured into grid-lines and intersections, eliminating the possibility to
reproduce a password where the difference is too high because of the need for precision
in DAS. Figure 2.2(j) is an image of the Pass-Go grid used.
Out of the schemes mentioned until now, most are neither widely known nor widely
used. The first known graphical password scheme that has gained increased attention
is the Android Unlock pattern. The Android Unlock pattern is a mini version of the
“Pass-Go” deployed on Google Android smartphones. Rather than entering a four-digit
PIN or a text-based password, the user enters a touch-drawn password on a 3× 3 grid
connecting dots forming a password. Figure 2.2(k) is a visualization of the Android
Unlock Pattern in use on a smartphone.
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(j) Pass-go [35] (k) Android Unlock Pattern
Looking at the recently published graphical password we find schemes like GeoPass [38]
and PicassoPass [41]. GeoPass uses a digital map for the authentication phase where
the user chooses a particular location as their password. PicassoPass is a graphical
password scheme presenting a password using a dynamic layered combination of
graphical elements. The users can make a story that assists the user in the recognition
of the graphical elements. Figure 2.2(l) and Figure 2.2(m) is the two new proposals
for graphical authentication schemes, the GeoPass and the PicassoPass, respectively.
(l) GeoPass [38] (m) PicassoPass [41]
Figure 2.2: Graphical password schemes
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2.3 Evaluation of Graphical Password Schemes
Authentication with text-based passwords are a traditional approach, but as a result of
limitations of recalling text-based passwords, users choose weaker passwords. Graphical
passwords came as an alternative solution for overcoming the limitations of text-based
passwords because the graphical memory of humans is particularly well-suited to
remember graphical information [12]. The problem with many graphical password
schemes is that they often promise improved password memorability and thus usability,
and at the same time improve the security [5]. The trade-off between usability and
security is illustrated in Figure 2.3. The observed trade-off between usability and
security are two aspects important to understand while reviewing the literature of
graphical passwords.
Figure 2.3: Tradeoff between usability and security
2.3.1 Usability and Memorability
An interesting question is what types of graphical password users find memorable.
One of the factors supporting users to remember their selected password relates to the
usability of the password scheme. What grants a graphical password high usability
and what is the effect of having high usability? This section will look at different
graphical password schemes focusing on the usability of the scheme.
Deja Vu was one of the graphical password schemes created in order to be easy to
remember, but at the same time being hard to reuse and share as a result of the
random art used. When Deja Vu was first proposed, the creators conducted a user
study showing that 90% of all participants succeeded the authentication phase using
Deja Vu. On the other side, the creators also revealed that only 70% managed to pass
the authentication process by using text-based passwords and PIN codes [13]. The
difference in success rate is an example of users tending to have a higher success rate
remembering graphical password over text-based passwords and PIN codes.
One of the first graphical password schemes, DAS [24], offered a theoretical space
comparable with text-based passwords. Based on cognitive studies of visual information,
Oorschot and Thorpe [36] investigated the practical password space of the graphical
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password scheme DAS [24]. They found that the password space in practice in DAS
represented an average length less than or equal to the length of 8 on a 5×5 grid.
Other researchers have revealed that users tend to draw symmetric images with few
pen strokes as well as placing their drawings in the center of the grid. The researchers
behind Background Draw A Secret[15] tried to avoid users placing their drawings in a
predictable way and by adding a background image to avoid the predictable behavior.
The attached background image resulted in a reduced amount of symmetry within the
selected passwords and helped the users make longer passwords that were similarly
memorable as for DAS.
Davis [11] did a comparison of the memorability between the graphical password
scheme Face (a light version of the PassFaces) and Story. The result reported that
users had more difficulties remembering the Story password, resulting in a success rate
of 85%. The low success rate was observed because the users had to remember the
correct sequence of the images, rather than remembering the images in an arbitrary
sequence.
When considering usability, we can evaluate the graphical layout of a graphical password
scheme to see if the visual elements impact the user’s choice of passwords. Ullenbeck
et al. [39] considered the Android Unlock patterns and investigated whether a change
in the graphical layout would impact the security and usability. The original Android
Pattern Lock uses a sequence of dots connected in a 3×3 grid of nodes. Instead of only
analyzing the original scheme, they rearranged the points into four separate positions
and analyzed patterns created by users for all four rearrangements. The results proved
that the number of unique patterns created was doubled by rearranging the points,
hence reduced the bias found in the original position of the nodes. However, they
did not only remove some of the bias from the original grid, but also introduced new
ones. One of the rearrangements was a random approach. Unfortunately, this random
arrangement of nodes looked like the mathematical delta, an association element that
was recognized by several of the participants. The random arrangement scored the
worst entropy seeing as many of the users selected the same pattern. People are good
at recognizing patterns and using association elements. It would not be surprising if
users found similar results in other rearrangements of the grid if it had a shape similar
to other symbols or association elements.
Wiedenbeck et al. [46, 47, 48] conducted three lab-based user studies on the graphical
password scheme PassPoint. The results determined that the participants needed an
average time of 63 seconds to create their password, and an additional average time of
171 seconds in training time to remember the created password. The login time took
between 9 and 19 seconds on average. The time spent highlights the importance of
research on usability and memorability when considering graphical password schemes.
The factors that grant a password scheme high usability can be determined by looking
at the average creation time, time to remember the password, as well as time used in
the login phase.
It is still a problem that published research on graphical passwords focusing on usability
are conducted with a pen and paper approach, raising a question about the results’
validity. One problem may be that many graphical passwords are not implemented,
but rather theoretical and visual suggestions. There is still a need for further research
on graphical passwords in their actual intended environment of use.
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2.3.2 Security
In knowledge-based authentication, e.g. something you know, we classify attacks into
two general categories: guessing and capturing attacks. In a guessing attack, the
adversary must search through the entire password space; this is often referred to as a
brute force attack. A brute force attack validates all possible combinations, making
such an attack highly time-consuming. If an attacker has some knowledge of the user
or the user’s password habits, the attacker would be able to predict the user’s password
by avoiding searching through the whole password space. Such a reduction in the
password space is a reduction in the overall security of the scheme. When managing to
reduce the search space, this type of attack is often referred to as a dictionary attack.
When talking about capturing attacks, the attackers can directly obtain the passwords
by observing the authentication process. One of the known capturing attacks on
graphical passwords is shoulder surfing where an attacker is able to observe a user’s
password as a cause of a visual presence.
When selecting a password, many users select a password that connects to them as a
person or to something they know. By using this strategy in the process of creating
a password, there will be a lower probability of forgetting the password because the
password is something you already know. When using such an approach, it is more
likely that the person remembers the password, while at the same time helping an
attacker to be able to guess the selected password quickly. There is a tradeoff between
what is possible to remember and what is secure enough to use; attackers utilize our
predictable behavior. A password created using this predictable behavior is called a
biased password. A bias is a prejudice in favor of or against one thing, person, or
group compared with another, usually in a way that influences a person’s choice of
action.
Jermyn et al. [24] evaluated the security of the graphical password scheme DAS.
One of the statements is that the users do not utilize a uniform distribution of the
possible passwords by using Klein’s study [25] as an argument. The fact that users
do not pick passwords uniformly is no itself a sufficient statement to make a guessing
attack successful. They try to cover the possibility of an attacker making a successful
attack by making their scheme more complex. The results revealed that the generated
passwords were significantly harder to crack in practice than textual passwords. The
problem with the conducted tests was that they used computer generated passwords
that do not achieve the same validity as user-selected passwords. Neither did they
analyze the security of DAS by including human factors that earlier have been reported
to introduce bias in the password selection process.
Why do users select the passwords they do, and what strategy do they use in the creation
process? Davis et al.[11] evaluated the security of the graphical password scheme
Passfaces. They found that there was a bias introduced by people’s demographics
and background. The users tended to choose faces that they liked (their subjective
meaning of beauty and attractiveness) and faces they could compare to themselves.
The results revealed that with sufficient knowledge of the gender and race of the user,
it would be possible to perform a dictionary attack to guess user-selected passwords
in the PassFace scheme. If the user were male, 10% of the passwords could easily be
guessed on the first or second attempt. Similarly, if the race of the user was known
to be Asian and his/her gender was also known, then 10% of the passwords could be
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guessed within the first six attempts. The result indicated that graphical passwords
selected by users were heavily biased. The researchers concluded that Passfaces was
insecure due to the observed bias in the selection of passwords.
Dirik et al. [14] conducted an experiment by modeling users choice in the graphical
password scheme PassPoints. The aim of the study was to test whether it would
be possible to build a dictionary attack based on a user’s choice of clicking points.
In this study, they predefined two different images with a different level of salient
points. The researchers reported that they could recover 61% of a user’s selection of
clicking points by searching through a smaller password space based on an analysis of
collected click-points. The PassPoints scheme provides user-chosen images, but the
aim of this study was to investigate whether it was possible to predict user’s passwords
using a dictionary attack on images after collected data. They observed a slight
difference in two out of three images picked by the researchers. The images including
few salient points were being stated as less insecure. Since the PassPoints scheme
enabled user-selected images, the security would rely on the image and clicking points
selected by the user, and not the actual scheme itself. The results can not solely state
that using PassPoints is insecure, but rather highlight the importance of considering
the human factors in security as it can influence the overall security of the scheme.
The same year, another research group published results on security of Passpoints by
using two separate research methods [37]. They conducted a user study, as well as a
theoretical study image-processing tool, to test whether an attack on the PassPoints
scheme was possible. They provided empirical evidence that attractive points, e.g.
hot-spots, do exist in images. The results from the most efficient attack were generated
by harvesting passwords from users to attack other targets. The probability of the
guessing attack showed that 36% of the passwords selected by users ended up being
guessed within 231 guesses and 12% could be guessed within 216 guesses. The results
from the simulated attack using image-processing were slightly less efficient, but they
still managed to prove that an attack on graphical passwords is possible.
One of the first large-scale studies on the Android Pattern Lock [39] stated that
the entropy of a pattern is lower than its theoretical entropy. The research group
compared the security offered by the Android Pattern Lock to be less than the security
of a randomly assigned three-digit PIN for guessing 20% of all passwords. In the
same research, a Markov model based on collected passwords was built. The patterns
created was categorized as offensive and defensive patterns as a result of their research
design. They set up a game asking all respondents to create a defensive pattern
protecting a possible award, as well as creating offensive patterns used for guessing
other participants’ defensive patterns. The results showed that it was possible to
guess a user’s choice of patterns. Within ten guesses, they could guess approximately
4% of the defensive patterns and approximately 7% of the offensive patterns. When
increasing the number of guesses to 30 attempts, they managed to guess approximately
9% of the defensive patterns and approximately 19% of the offensive patterns. If we
look further into the Android Unlock Pattern, the scheme has roughly 400.000 possible
valid combinations of patterns. From a theoretical point of view, such theoretical
password spaces are comparable to the security of a 5-digit randomly assigned PIN.
The researchers’ evaluation of user-chosen patterns explains that they only have
an estimated entropy slightly lower than a 3-digit randomly assigned PIN. Another
interesting discovery by the researchers is that around 10% of all users use less than 190
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patterns, while less than 300 patterns capture around 50% of the whole test popluation.
This result is an indication of the theoretical password space not being a representative
number when quantifying the security of a password scheme. We should rather look at
the password space in practice, e.g. passwords that are used and memorized by users.
Psychology studies have recognized humans’ superior memory for recognizing and
recalling visual information. This observation supports the statement that users can
remember more complicated graphical password from a larger password space than an
alphanumeric password. Based on this assumption, the attacker needs to build a bigger
and more complex dictionary and spend more time achieving the same success rate
as for textual passwords. A clever attacker would narrow down the password space
and prioritize guesses to pictures that people are likely to choose. The images that are
selected are liable to be the images that users are likely to recall. To understand how
an attacker might take advantage of human password choices, psychological studies on
humans’ visual memory are crucial to comprehend.
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2.4 Psychology and Human Factors
In many years, the field of psychology have been important in order to understand
how humans interpret and remember information. Psychology studies have recognized
that the human brain have a superior memory for remembering and recalling visual
information rather than recognizing and recalling verbal or textual information [12].
To be able to go beyond the technical part of security, this section includes related
work on passwords focusing on psychology and the human aspects. Combining research
from the two different disciplines computer security and psychology, can give a deeper
understanding of passwords at a human level.
Figure 2.4: Dual-Coding Theory
One known theory from the world of psychology
is the dual-coding theory [5]. The theory suggests
that verbal and non-verbal memory are processed
and represented differently in humans mind. Text
are verbal information represented by symbols,
in contrast to non-verbal information like images
that mentally represent perceived concepts as-
signed to a perceived meaning of what is being
directly observed. Both verbal and non-verbal in-
formation can be used when recalling information.
For example, a person have received stimulus of
the concept cat, the image as well as the word cat (Figure 2.4). When a person is asked
to recall the concept of cat, a person can retrieve the image or the word individually,
or both simultaneously. If a person remembers the word cat, the image of the cat is
not lost will be possible to retrieve at a later point in time. The ability to code a
stimulus in two separate ways can increase human’s ability to remember, in contrast
to only code the stimulus one way.
When it comes to humans and visual interpretation, studies support the idea that
people recall symmetric images better than asymmetric images [4, 18]. A particular
interesting observation is that mirror symmetry carries a special status I the human
memory [43]. An understanding of psychological studies on visual memory can help
to build successful attacks against graphical passwords. If an attacker successfully
manages to use the symmetric properties of graphical password schemes, the security
of the scheme might be significantly reduced.
Besides choosing symmetric password, humans tend to be influenced by graphical
elements in a password scheme. A study on the PassFace scheme [11] revealed that
there was a high bias in the password selection according to a user’s gender and race.
When analyzing the choice of faces according to the participant’s gender, most of
the male and female participants chose female faces. In addition to the bias towards
preferring female faces, 60-70% of the participants preferred a model over a typical
female/male person. They also looked at the race of the faces, where the results
showed that almost all of the participant preferred their own race. This research
raises the question if it is possible to analyze user’s choice in passwords based on the
demographics of a user.
A difference in graphical and text-based password schemes is that graphical passwords
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can use images with colors that may influence a user’s choice in graphical passwords. In
a user-study [37] on the image-based scheme PassPoints, it was observed that different
images were easier guessed compared to other pictures. When analyzing different
images and visualizations, gestalt psychology [44] is an important field to understand
user’s interpretation of visual objects. The picture from the user-study being easily
guessed was the picture of cars in various positions and different colors. A possible
explanation could be that humans seek to find a pattern in an image that are easily
remembered. Structured images can be analyzed by using the principles of grouping,
similarities of color, and similarity of size in the picture, e.g. the gestalt principles,
helping humans to be able to remember the image.
Password habits may be different across different subpopulation as a cause of back-
ground and culture. In 2012, Joseph Bonneau released an analysis of 70 million
passwords from Yahoo! [7]. The passwords were analyzed in terms of guessing rate
by performing a dictionary attack. The collected data contained 328 subpopulations.
The results showed that there were no better populations compared to others in
the collected data, but there was observed a variation in the different populations.
Demographically, gender had a small effect on the guessing rate while age increased
across different age groups. The analysis also revealed that language had a significant
impact on the password strength where Indonesian-speaking users were among the
weakest subpopulations as a contrast to German and Korean-speaking users that
provided stronger passwords.
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2.5 Graphical Passwords and Mobile Devices
Users are not only dependent on remembering passwords across multiple web pages
and systems but do also need to remember passwords for our small mobile devices.
The use of handheld devices, such as smartphones and tablets, has seen tremendous
growth in the recent years. The smartphone in general has revived increased attention
because of its increased capacity and its variety of use. On the first version of the
smartphones, users could access their email, participate in social networks, as well
as the basic features of a phone like calling and text messaging. During the past
years, the gap between a desktop and a smartphone have become smaller and smaller.
People today use their mobile phone for work purposes, mobile banking, and online
shopping. This progression of the smartphone sets higher standards of the security on
smartphones. A smartphone is a handy tool in daily life but do also contain a lot of
sensitive of your private life. Mobile devices can easily be lost or stolen due to it small
size, making an increased need for protecting the sensitive data from unauthorized
access.
The smartphone have emerged as an excellent platform for graphical passwords because
its intuitive interaction with the touch screen in contrast to text-based passwords on
mobile devices. Graphical passwords on mobile devices seem like a natural fit, as they
often require direct manipulation of visual elements. For avoiding unwanted access
on smartphones, different locking mechanisms are provided. The history of locking
mechanisms was often a solution solely to prevent accidental use while current mobile
phones require protection to secure the potentially vast amount of private data that
we keep on our smartphones. The situation of our active use of mobile phones, as well
as its well-suited platform for using a graphical password, makes authentication on
mobile devices an interesting field of study.
When looking at mobile security it’s necessary to be familiar with the magnitude of
mobile phone usage. As of 2014, over 90% of American adults owned a mobile phone,
whereas 58% of American adults owned a smartphone [32]. Another 34% of the users
used their phone regularly instead of using other devices such as a desktop or laptop
computer for searching on the Internet. The numbers are collected from a population
only living in the USA, but still provides insightful information about the usage of
mobile devices today.
As stated earlier, as a cause of users storing sensitive information on their phones,
it is important to understand the relationship between the use of security features
and users risk perceptions. One aspect essential to understand is the reason people
choose to use, or not use, screen locks on their smartphone. Engelman et al. [16]
published a research paper in cooperation with Google on people’s screen locking
behavior and attitude towards security on their smartphones. They observed a strong
correlation between the use of security features and risk perceptions. They reported
that 33% of the smartphone users were thinking about the locking mechanisms as
too much of a hassle. At the same time, 26% of the same population didn’t think
that someone would care about the information stored on their smartphone. Another
research group studying the same topic revealed that 46.8% of the participants agreed
or fully agreed that unlocking their phone can be annoying. At the same time, 95.5%
of the respondents somewhat agreed or fully agreed that they liked the idea that their
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phone was protected [20]. Locking a smartphone are crucial, even if users do not prefer
it because they think that it is annoying. A study reported that 29% did not use
any for of locking mechanisms [32] while another research stated that among 35% of
mobile users do not lock their phone [40]. The number may vary, but it still highlights
that the users want to be secure while at the same time do not wish to use security
mechanisms. The results reported might be an indication of a trade-off between the
time need to type a password and users risk perception. What is more important,
time used or level of protection?
In terms of security, it is interesting to look at the use of mobile devices and locking
habits. Services that are in active use are known to be protected by a weaker password
as a cause of the overhead in time spend typing the password. In 2014, a group of
researchers published a field study of users (un)locking behavior [20]. The problem
observed was that that user had to unlock their screen frequently. In the field study,
they found a significant overhead in the time used for unlocking their phone. The
participants used on average 2.9%, and up to 9% in the worst case, of their time
interacting with the smartphone unlocking the screen.
It is stated that many users use their smartphones to perform tasks that involve
utilization and storage of sensitive data. Smartphones today do not require their
users to use any locking mechanism on their smartphone. As a cause of users tending
to choose the easiest way out may result in the choice of not having any locking
mechanism at all. By not using any locking mechanisms, the security risks of looking
sensitive information are ignored. In a study, over 40% of the users only used the basic
Slide-to-unlock mechanism on their smartphone, as well as over 16% did not use any
locking mechanisms at all [20]. This result highlights an a bad habit among mobile
users that may have consequences. What happens if your mobile is stolen? A loss of a
mobile phone is not just the cost of replacing the physical device, but also a loss of
sensitive data. If the wrong person finds the device, sensitive data on the device may
be lost and used for unintended purposes. In 2012, Pew Internet estimated that nearly
a third of mobile users have had their mobile device stolen or lost [31]. It is interesting
to compare people’s locking behavior towards phones that are stolen or lost. The same
report also stated that 12% of cell owners say that another person have accessed their
phone, making the owners feel that their privacy being exposed to the public.
Besides losing a physical device, what consequences relates to the loss of a smartphone?
One point of attack is to get access to people’s email account. If you can grant access to
someone’s email, you probably can get access to a lot more as a cause of password reset
sent to the user’s email. A study reported that all of their interviewed participants
had their email account automatically logged in, as well as 31% of them did not
use any locking mechanism at all [16]. The same research group investigated how
much information you could gain from getting access to a person email account. The
results revealed that both users with or without locking mechanisms found sensitive
information in their email account like SSN, Bank Account Number, Email Password
and Home Address. Mobile devices might contain more sensitive information than
users are aware of.
23
2.6 The Android Unlock Pattern
One of the most popular smartphones in the market is the Android smartphones.
Automatic screen lock is one of the most commonly used protection for unauthorized
access on smartphones. Android provides several password mechanisms like PIN code,
alphanumeric password, pattern lock, face lock, and slide-to-unlock. Among these
screen lock options, the slide-to-unlock mechanism only avoids accidental interaction
with the screen. Alphanumeric password and PINs are the must commonly used
authentication mechanisms used on smartphones, as well as in other systems requiring
authentication. An alphanumeric password are created from all writable characters,
while PIN codes only use digits. The newly released face-unlock uses image processing
to analyze your face to grant access to your phone. The Android operating system are
being known for the graphical password called Pattern Lock released by Google in 2008.
This graphical password scheme is at this time available on all Android devices, as
well provided on other mobile operating systems apart from Apples’ mobile operating
system, iOS.
The Android Pattern Lock is one of the commonly used screen locks mechanisms on
Android devices. For unlocking a device using pattern lock, the user is asked to draw
a user-defined sequence of connected dots on a 3×3 grid. Such path is called an
lock pattern and is presented in Figure 2.2(k). When creating a pattern, Google has
designed several rules for creating a pattern:
1. A pattern needs to be defined by at least 4 dots.
2. A dot can only be selected once meaning that the maximum number of connected
dots are 9 (as defined by the dots in the 3×3 grid).
3. The pattern will always connect all dots along a path, expect when a dot already
has been selected.
4. A pattern can go through previously connected dots to connect dots along the
same path.
5. The dots can be connected horizontally, vertically and by the diagonal.
The first and second rule only states the minimum and maximum number of connected
dots in the pattern. The third rule denotes that if a path is drawn from node 1 to node
3, then the nodes in the path will be 1→ 2→ 3 as a cause of rule number three. Rule
number four states that you can go through a node that is already in the path, but
the node will only be selected once. Such path are called an overlap. Pattern having
an overlap are illustrated in Figure 2.5(b) by having chosen the path 5 → 3 → 7,
where node 5 is not selected twice when going from node 3 to node 7. Figure 2.5(a)
illustrates rule number five displaying all nodes that reachable and the valid directions;
vertically, horizontally, and diagonally.
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(a) Reachable nodes from node 1 (b) Create a path over a selected node
Figure 2.5: Illustration of the Android Pattern creation rules
In a historical view, the Android Unlock pattern is seen as a new authentication
mechanism as opposite to alphanumeric passwords and PIN codes. In a security
perspective, the pattern has a total of 389,112 valid patterns using a 3 × 3 grid.
Comparing the Android Lock Pattern with PIN codes, having 10.000 possible codes,
the Android Lock Pattern seems to be more secure. Compared to an alphanumeric
password, the number of combinations depends on the number of characters included.
When looking at published research, users are capable of remembering passwords with
an average length of 7 to 8 characters. As introduced, the Android unlock pattern is
a more suitable form of authentication for mobile devices due to its interactive and
graphical form that suits small touch screens. When using an alphanumeric password
on a smartphone, a virtual keyboard are used typing the password, making it less
suitable for mobile devices because of the size. Smartphones are being used in various
situations during a day, making it desirable to use an authentication mechanism that is
quick to type and easy to remember, avoid spending the time unlocking the smartphone.
It is no secret that an alphanumeric password with its extensive password space would
be more secure if users created long passwords. However, this is not the reality because
mobile devices do are not suitable for typing long passwords on the virtual keyboard.
To further explore the security and usability of the Android unlock pattern, we will
take a look at published research to get an overview.
# Length # Valid combinations
4 1624
5 7152
6 26,016
7 72,912
8 140,704
9 140,704
Total 389,112
Table 2.1: Number of pattern combinations
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As stated, the Android Pattern Lock has 389,112 valid patterns, according to the
listed rules. But is this number as secure as it sounds? When looking at the security
of a password scheme it can evaluated according to total valid combinations, e.g. the
password space or the passwords that statistically are likely of being chosen. The
passwords that statistically are likely of being chosen refers to the password space
in practice. Table 2.1 summarizes the total number of valid combinations based on
the pattern length [34]. An another way of look at the security of the a pattern is to
measure the pattern strength. A research paper investigated the use of password meter
for measuring the strength of a pattern. Their hypothesis was that the utilization of a
password meter was providing more secure user-selected patterns. They stated that
there often tended to choose a short and easily guessed pattern due to memorability.
A password meter is often shown as a colored bar that is often used as an indication
of the strength of a password. The research group used a mathematical equation (2.1)
for calculating the strength of Android pattern locks.
PSP = SP × log2(LP + IP +OP ) (2.1)
PSp is the strength score of pattern P. SP , LP , IP , and OP are the number of
connected nodes, the physical length, the number of intersections, and the number of
overlaps of P, respectively. Using Equation 2.1 on all valid patterns gives a score from
6.340 to 46.807. The formula was being utilized by Sun et al. [34] in their research on
Android patterns and password meters. They look at pattern strength in a different
way other than just calculating the complexity of a pattern by its length. Calculating
password complexity by length seems as a naive approach, making this way more
realistic using all the rules of the Android pattern in the equation. When looking at
the different characteristics and strength of a pattern used in Equation 2.1, Sun et
al. maked distribution graphs of the different characteristics and the strength (Figure
2.6).
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(a) Pattern physical length (b) Pattern intersections
(c) Pattern overlaps (d) Pattern strength
Figure 2.6: The distribution of the pattern characteristics and strength [34]
Sun et al. [34] created two different visualizations of a password meter, one looking like
a progress bar (Type 1), and one indicating a percent of the strength (Type 2). They
recruited 81 participants for a survey testing the strength of user-created patterns.
They divided the participants into three separate groups; no password meter (Group
A), password meter type 1 (Group B), and password meter type 2 (Group C). The
survey randomly assigned the participants to the separate groups. The result revealed
that the strength of the created patterns in group B and C had a higher complexity
and strength but had a higher error rate when retyping the pattern. As a researcher
explained, users are typically more security conscious when they are aware of the
need for such behavior [2]. The error rate points to the problems with passwords and
security in general. A long and complicated password are harder to guess but are not
likely to be selected due to memorability issues. Also, a problem with the Android
Pattern is that the pattern is being frequently used as it is provided to grant access to
the smartphone in all kind of situations. The results from the survey states that the
input convince was the reason that caused the highest number of participants in the
user study not selecting a pattern with a high complexity and strength. A pattern
containing more dots takes a longer time to type. When looking at patterns containing
intersections and overlaps, there is a high chance of accidentally hitting a wrong dot
when drawing a pattern. Such an error are causing the user to redraw the pattern,
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hence spending more time passing the authentication process. The conclusion is that
the time used to type the pattern are as crucial as the time used to memorize the
pattern when looking at the users choice in patterns.
The pattern strength meter gives a score of the visual complexity of a pattern. The
benefit of looking at the visual complexity instead of only looking at the length can be
seen in Figure 2.7. When looking at Figure 2.7(a), 2.7(b), and 2.7(c), they have all
have the maximum length, but at the same time having a different pattern strength,
e.g. a difference in visual complexity. Figure 2.7(g), 2.7(h), and 2.7(i) have all the
minimum length of four dots, but they still have a difference in the measured strength.
The visual complexity is one of the extra security dimensions to study when working
with graphical passwords. The pattern itself is just a sequence of numbers, but the
order of the sequence can make a big difference in visual complexity, and can be
important when wanting to avoid known attacks like shoulder surfing.
When looking at user-selected passwords, studies tell that many users are using
graphical shapes to support memory [45]. Sun et al. [34] analyzed collected Android
Lock Patterns and found empirical evidence that some users tended to use patterns
which looked like letters or numbers. They found patterns looking like the letters and
numbers C, L, N, Z, 2, and 7 that easily can be created on a 3×3 grid. Such a strategy
for enhancing memorability by using association elements, e.g something that the user
are familiar with, are used in other password schemes. The use of association elements
is known to used in PIN codes and alphanumeric passwords where names, objects,
dates are used to remember the password instead of a visual representation of a letter
or number.
Android Unlock pattern have been shown to have biases when being user-chosen.
A research group did one of the first large-scale user study on the security of the
Android Unlock Patterns in order to quantify the security of the Android Pattern Lock
[39]. They analyzed the biases introduced in the pattern making process and added
changes to the scheme in order to avoid the known biases in the password scheme.
The researchers found that there was a high bias in the pattern selection process, e.g.
the upper left corner and three-point long straight lines are likely being selected. If
user-chosen patterns were being uniformly chosen, the probability of starting in at any
point should be 11%. The results revealed that there was a strong bias towards the
starting point in the corners. If the points were uniformly chosen, the probability for
all four corners should be 44%, but the results showed that the probability is close to
75% in their pen-and-paper study. In contrast, the center point, the right, the upper,
and the lower center points only got a probability of 14% to be selected. Other results
from the pen-and-paper study found that the average pattern length was 5.63 with a
standard deviation of 1.5. As stated earlier, users tend to take the easiest way out,
making users choose short patterns that are easy to remember and type. Looking at
the selection of starting node, 43% in the user study, and 38% in the pen-and-paper
study selected the upper-left corner as their starting node. This is supporting the
researchers claim that users tend to choose less secure patterns “in the wild” than a
theoretical evaluation of a password scheme.
What is causing the biases observed in the Android Pattern Lock? The next chapter
will introduce a research design for collecting Android Pattern Locks for further analysis
focusing on human factors.
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(a) Sequence: 147852369,
Strength: 27.00
(b) Sequence:213546879,
Strength: 36.655
(c) Sequence: 591827346,
Strength: 46.807
(d) Sequence: 968752,
Strength: 15.259
(e) Sequence: 1269853,
Strength: 20.781
(f) Sequence: 36578249,
Strength: 30.512
(g) Sequence: 1478,
Strength: 6.339
(h) Sequence: 5968,
Strength: 9.086
(i) Sequence: 4927,
Strength: 11.786
Figure 2.7: Examples of patterns with different length and strength
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3 | Data Collection
Section 3.1 is the detailed description of the research strategy; the survey. For the
selected research strategy, a corresponding sampling technique are described in Section
3.2. For knowing what kind of data to collect, a review of human properties is included
in Section refsec:reviewofproperties. When collecting data, it is crucial to know how
many samples are needed for being able to get significant results. Section 3.4 is an
elaboration of how the sample size were selected. Some of the data properties are
might difficult to collect for several reasons. Section 3.5 provides a list of collection
strategies that working as predictive countermeasures to be used in the data collection
process if needed.
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3.1 Research Strategy
This section will provide information about the chosen research strategy. A research
strategy is being considered as the selected strategy for being able to answer the
main research goals; the hypotheses and the research questions. Briony J. Oates [28]
presents six different research strategies: survey, experiment, design and creation, case
study, action research, and ethnography. This section will not go further in describing
the difference between the six strategies, but rather explain the choice of research
strategy. The detailed work behind the choice in research design was carried out in
preliminary work beforehand of this thesis [26].
The selected research strategy for this dissertation is a survey. The idea of a survey
is that it will obtain some kind of data from a large group of people or events, in a
standardized and systematic way [28]. The survey is chosen due to the amount of
data needed for the analysis, as well as the lack of time for choosing other approaches,
like interviews and other observation techniques. There are different ways of creating
a survey, for example, pen-and-paper or using an online survey. For this research,
an online survey is selected for several reasons. First, a pen-and-paper survey is too
time-consuming to perform and are not scalable for international data collection. It
is also desired to keep responses anonymous due to the topic of research. The form
of administration is, therefore, self-administered as there is no one present when the
respondent answers the survey. More information about the sampling technique is
described in section 3.2.
In the preliminary work, wireframes were created as a draft of the survey. These
wireframes can be found in Appendix A. Chapter 4 will have a final implemented
version giving a more detailed description of the survey.
3.2 Sampling Technique
The sampling frame is a list of the whole population of people that could be included
in the survey. When looking at the sample of this study, there is not possible to make
a limited sampling frame that can be summered in a list. The population of the sample
frame is considered as all people with a smartphone because this research looks at
people’s choice of Graphical Password, in particular the Android Lock Patterns that is
a mobile authentication scheme.
When conducting a survey, it needs to be decided how to select people from the
sampling frame. There are two different ways of doing sampling: probability sampling
and non-probability sampling [28]. Probability sampling means that the sample has
been chosen because the researcher believes that there is a high probability that
the sample of respondents selected is representative for the overall population being
studied. Non-probability sampling means that the researcher does not know whether
the sample of people is the overall population.
Because of the broad sampling frame it would be feasible to use non-probability
sampling for this research. When using non-probability sampling, we make a decision
that it is not practicable to describe a representative sample because there is too
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much uncertainty about the respondents that will voluntary answer the questionnaire.
When choosing a non-probability sampling, we need to select an sampling technique.
The possible sampling techniques we can choose from is purposive sampling, snowball
sampling, self-selection sampling, and convenience sampling [28]. The purposive
sampling technique requires the researcher deliberately to choose people that are likely
to produce valuable data to meet the purpose of the research. This requirement would
not be a good technique because I am not able to pick who would participate, as
well as the data collection need to be performed worldwide. A Purposive sampling
technique would maybe provide a more uniform collection of people, but it is hard to
control respondents when the survey is distributed over the Internet. The snowball
sampling technique utilize the network from one person of the sample frame, and
then collects new names from that person. The need for directly communicate with
respondents is not possible for me as a researcher. First, I have no contact with the
respondents. Second, the respondents, should remain anonymous when answering the
questionnaire, as well as there should be possible to track the information back to
the respondent. When using the convenience sampling technique, the researcher only
selects respondents who are convenient for them, because they are easy to reach or
willing to help.
When doing self-selection sampling, the researcher advertises their interest in a partic-
ular topic and their need for respondents and collect data from anyone who are willing
to participate. The self-selection sampling strategy looks like an excellent fit for the
research. The survey needs to be distributed over the Internet, and the self-selection
strategy will support this choice. People who select themselves for research often do
so because they have strong feeling for the subject, or that the research can bring
them a personal benefit. A self-selection sampling technique may also reduce the
bias that can be introduced when the researcher hand-picks the respondents. With
the self-selection sampling strategy allows all interested peoples with a smartphone
to participate in the research. The self-selection is a useful technique when directly
contact is not achievable. The self-selection sampling remains the technique that are
looking as the best fit for this research.
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3.3 Review of Human Properties
When using an online survey, the human properties must be carefully selected. First,
when a survey is distributed on the Internet there is no way back, and we need to be
sure that the chosen questions will provide sufficiently and relevant data for answering
the hypothesis. Second, we need to review all human properties and only select a suited
number of them. A too long survey may result in a small number of responses because
the time needed to complete the survey if all the properties is included. Third, some of
the properties may not have a suitable grouping of answers, and may be challenging to
include in a survey that needs to be replied to on a mobile device. If such a property
is included, it needs to provide irreplaceable and valuable information for the analysis.
The survey should try to avoid time-consuming and complicated questions if possible.
This section will provide a detailed review of the human properties.
Language preference
By asking the respondent about their language preference it can be used to check
whether the alphabet a respondent use impacts their choice in lock pattern. For
example, Chinese words are written in a different way then people using the Latin
alphabet. In the Android Unlock Patterns, people are able to create patterns looking
the same as the letters ’L’, ’M’, and ’O’. The Figure 3.1 there is an illustration the
letters that are possible to select a lock pattern. The same possibility could be found
in languages using a different alphabet than the Latin. When looking at PIN codes,
there are certain numbers that have a different meaning than only its numeric value.
In China, people are associating certain words with numbers or things based on the
similarities of sound. For example, the number eight is considered as a lucky number
because it is pronounced "ba", which sounds like the Chinese word for prosperity
[8]. Other numbers like 4 and 775 are pronounced in the same way as "death" and
"Kiss me", respectively. Looking at the selection of PIN codes based on people’s
language, people tend to choose PIN codes that they can associate to a number of
special meanings. Examples of this behavior are PIN selection corresponding to date
of birth.
(a) The letter L (b) The letter M (c) The letter O
Figure 3.1: Patterns corresponding to letters
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Age and Gender
A group of people within a particular group of age may have different risk awareness.
A person with an age of 30-40 years and a person younger than 20 years may have
different concerns with security. A person of age between 30-40 may use their phone
to perform a task with requiring high security, like tasks related for work purposes.
A person with an age below 20 may not have the same security awareness because
of the different use of mobile devices, as well as experience. Age is also interesting
demographic information that can be used to group the respondents into distinct
subgroups. When looking at gender, psychological studies have reported that males
are more likely to take risks than females [9]. In the literature review, there were no
results found related to gender and risk awareness. However, researchers have found
bias in the password selection process of PassFace when looking at gender.
Handedness
An interesting property of humans is the fact that people write with either left or
right hand (and sometimes both). Handedness can influence the way a person are
holding a mobile phone, and may impact their choice of lock pattern. In the literature
review, it was not found any studies that reported results of people choices in patterns
based on handedness. Published research [39] found that over 40% of the participants
in their study started their Android pattern by beginning in the upper-left corner,
but did not record the hand used when collecting the patterns. A question to be
answered is whether a left-handed person using the left hand while interacting with
the screen increases the probability for starting in the upper right corner. Figure 3.2
illustrates handedness and likely starting point as a hypothesis, where the percentages
attached to the nodes are indicating the probability for starting in the node. The
right part of Figure 3.2 are collected from the research by Uellenbeck [39] while the
numbers on left part are only hypothetical numbers. Since it is more likely that people
are right-handed, are we able to mirror the results in the right figure for left-handed
people? My hypothesis as stated earlier is that people that are left-handed are more
likely to start in the upper right corner, while people that are right-handed are more
likely to start in the upper left corner.
Figure 3.2: Likely chosen initial starting point [39] and handedness
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Nationality
The nationality of users is often used in research on graphical passwords. When asking
a person about their PIN code, a nationality can be used to find likely numbers to
appear because some cultures associates a number with a historical or religious event.
In a research on the PassFace, the nationality of the participants was proven to be
valuable because people tended to choose faces from the same race and nationality.
In this research, it is uncertain how much this information will help to prove any
connection between nationality and users choice in patterns. Properties like language
preference and reading/writing orientation look more promising for this research.
However, the nationality is a data property that are useful when getting an overview
of the population.
Reading and writing orientation
In different cultures, there is a difference in the reading and writing orientation.
Cultures of Europe and America usually write and read horizontally from left to right,
but there are other cultures that do otherwise. Figure 3.3 illustrates three different
ways of reading and writing. Traditionally, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean are writing
text vertically in columns from top to bottom, from right to left. Another writing
orientation is horizontal from right to left used in Arabic speaking countries. Today,
the vertical orientation from top to bottom is often in a horizontal way due to the
influence of English and the increased computerized typesetting, but both ways are
still in use. There is research that have reported that the writing orientation are
affecting the visual attention and memory [10]. They found that the reading orientation
affected the way a person would memorize objects. They reported that English and
Chinese speakers tended to remember an image that appeared in the top, left-hand
side of the screen. The Taiwanese speakers in the study tended to remember images
on the opposite side of the screen, the images on the upper-right side of the screen.
An interesting aspect of the reading and writing orientation is to see if people from
different cultures are choosing different patterns due to their writing orientation.
(a) Left-to-right (b) Right-to-left (c) Top-to-bottom, left-
to-right
Figure 3.3: Reading and writing orientation
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Profession and Occupation
The current profession of a person may say something about persons knowledge and
background. When looking at profession, a person with a profession in IT may be
more certain of the security aspects than people in other professions. It may cause
bias in the data if people with enough knowledge of security overcompensate their
choice of lock pattern because they want to prove their knowledge. Occupation is
valuable information due to the knowledge level of the respondents. The occupation of
the a respondent is simply if a person is a student, employed, not employed or retired.
Finger, handsize, and screensize
When looking at the finger used when creating the pattern, it impacts the reachable
areas on the smartphone. When interacting with a smartphone, the most common
way is to either use the thumb or the forefinger. When combining this property with
the screen size and the size of the hand, we might be able to predict the selection of
patterns by eliminating areas that are harder to reach. In a book called Designing
Mobile Interfaces [22], they used an expression called the thumb zone. The Thumb
Zone is the most comfortable area for a person to touch when holding a smartphone
using one hand. Figure 3.4(b) is showing the thumb zone where the green area is
where the thumb can easily access. The orange and the red areas are part of the
screen that is harder to reach. The thump zone can be used when looking at users
choice of patterns a pattern that are easy to type can be more likely of being created.
Smartphones today tends to get bigger and bigger in size. An interesting analysis
could be done by looking at user’s choice in patterns based on the size of their hands
and size of the screen. By looking at a situation where a person with a small hand is
interacting with a big screen, it may be hard to reach certain areas of the screen when
holding the smartphone in one hand. Maybe a right-handed person with a small hand
interacting with a large screen will not be able to reach the upper left corner? The
situation are illustrated in Figure 3.4(a).
(a) Reachable points on screen (b) The thumb
zone
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3.4 Calculating the Sample Size
It is essential to determine an appropriate sample size to be able to make any conclusions
with the data. When a sample size is too big, it will lead to an unnecessary waste
of time in this study due to the time frame of the thesis. On the other hand, if the
sample size is too small, the results can not be considered to be used for statistical
tests, and it might not be possible to come up with a reliable conclusion. When using
known formulas for calculating the sample size, you need to know the population
size, preferred margin of error, desired confidence interval, and the percentage of
the population that is likely to answer. In this study, these parameters are hard to
determine because of the non-probability sampling technique that are being selected
for this study. For example, the targeted population size is hard to estimate because it
includes all people with a smartphone worldwide. Because of the uncertainty connected
to the sampling technique, there do not exist a known formula for calculating the
sample size. We are not able to calculate the sample size by a known formula, but the
sample size still needs to be decided based on my subjective meaning. The sample size
is determined by what is achievable with the time frame available, as well as what I as
a researcher think of as a good enough sample to ensure sufficient data for getting any
results.
The greater the accuracy required by my claim that my sample size represent the
whole population adequately; the larger your sample size needs to be. Statisticians
have produced tables that correlate population size against the sample size for the
required level of confidence and accuracy. Table 3.1 is a recommended sample size for
using a survey (using 95% confidence interval and +/- 3% accuracy range) estimated
by the targeted population size [28]. As stated in Table 3.1, the sample size does not
increase at the same rate as the target population. When looking at all people that
owns a mobile phone worldwide, we can argue that the targeted population size is
greater than 1,000,000, and we, therefore, need a sample size of at least 1000. It would
be desirable to get a sample size bigger than 1000, but due to the time frame of this
research, a sample size of 1000 should me achieved.
Target Population Size Required sample size
50 47
5000 760
100,000 888
900,000 895
>1,000,000 1000+
Table 3.1: Target population and sample size [28]
Since the sampling size is quite high, and the survey is being distributed with a self-
selection sampling strategy over the Internet, it is still important to provide some level
of control of the respondents. Using a self-selection sampling technique implies that
there is no control of who will answer the survey, hence likely that some subgroups will
have a higher representation that others. In a situation where lacking respondents from
a subgroup, it should be recruited more participants from the subgroup. However, when
using such a strategy, it might introduce some bias because I would then influence the
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sample. Section 3.5 will look at some strategies for responses from different subgroups
that may be underrepresented when using a self-selection sampling technique.
3.5 Response Rate and Non-responses
The survey is distributed over the internet, making it difficult to maintain control
over how many people are willing to respond and how many people from different
subgroups that are reachable. To be able to achieve the amount of data needed for an
analysis, a strategy are need if a subgroup are being underrepresented in the sample.
Below, there are listed a strategy for collecting data from the different subgroups. The
strategies are being included as a cause of some subgroups might being less willing
to respond, or harder to reach, because they are outside the network of the people
involved in this research.
People with age of 60 or higher: People with the age over 60 may not own a
smartphone or may be hard to reach for other reasons. It would be beneficial to find
networks where containing a high representation of people with an age of 60 or higher.
In Norway, there is a network called "Seniorweb." There is also a magazine called “vi
over 60” for senior citizens with members with an age over 60. Both networks are
possible to contact if there is a lack of respondents from this subgroup.
People with a different field of interest than IT and security: The network of
the people involved in this research is being overrepresented by people with a profession
in IT and security. It is needed to find other networks to be able to reach out to
other people with other jobs. For reaching out to people with other professions, it
is a possibility to use the network from my family or directly contact a company in
an another field. The university is a good start because of the high representation of
different fields of study.
People with a reading orientation from right-to-left: The primary reading
orientation is from right-to-left, except some Arabic and Asian nationalities. My
network does not include a high sample of people that have another reading and
writing direction than my own. To reach out to other nationalities, NTNU is a
possibility for getting help to distribute the survey to countries where NTNU have
exchange programs.
People living in a different country than Norway: The sample should include
respondents from different nationalities to obtain diversity in the sample. It is not easy
to reach out to other countries if not having a big international network. NTNU has
exchange students at the campus from different parts of the world. The preliminary
work for this thesis was presented at a conference named Passwordscon. At the
conference, many security interested people met at the conference are potential help
for the distribution of the survey to other countries.
People that are left-handed: There is a significant higher percentage of people
that are right-handed, meaning that there is a possibility of getting more responses
from right-handed people. Selecting a strategy for this is hard because there is not a
known official network for left-handed people. There is a possibility of using groups at
Facebook like “Left-Hander’s Club.”
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4 | A Detailed Description of the
Survey
The challenge of analysing user-selected passwords is that you need to have any
passwords to analyze. The majority of the research on passwords are often conducted
using passwords from leakages or passwords distributed from other sources. Looking
at the Android Lock Pattern, there exist no distributed sources and all patterns
locks being used by people are stored locally on each device. To be able to analyse
user-selected patterns, all patterns are being collected from the survey described in
this Chapter.
The survey is a custom designed and implemented specifically for this research. The
survey will be described in detail throughout the chapter, starting with an elaboration
of the requirements in Section 4.1 and a detailed description of how the survey works
in Section 4.2. As described in Chapter 3, when starting sending out the survey, there
is no way back for changing the survey. Therefore, Section 4.3 contains a detailed
description of how the survey was tested before being distributed. The last section of
this survey is an elaboration of the ethical aspects of this research.
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4.1 Requirements
When addressing the difficulties of collecting patterns, it is important to define
requirements for the survey application. This section will walk through a list of
requirements specified for the survey. Each requirement are being described in detail
below.
R1: The survey should be able to stand for all commutation to
the respondents
R2: The survey should be considered as trustworthy
R3: The survey should be implemented on a technical device
reflecting the environment of the Android Lock Pattern
R4: The survey should be easy to understand and easy to com-
plete
R5: The survey should be visual appealing
R6: The survey should be provide easy navigation between the
questions
R7: The survey should provide high security
Table 4.1: Survey requirements
R1 - One way communication
The survey will be an online application, meaning that the user interface of the survey
application is the only way being able to communicate with the respondents. The
respondents will not be able to directly talk to me during the survey, hence important
how designing the application for communicating with the respondents.
When sending out the survey, there are no record of who will receive the survey.
The respondents might come from different cultures and countries, hence requiring a
universal way of communicating with the respondents. The survey are being written
in English, but there is a chance that there persons entering the survey not being able
to understand English properly. Instead of using too much words, it is preferable to
use icons and illustrations. The use of icons instead of text is not just beneficial for
English-speaking respondents, rather a design choice making the whole application
easier to understand for all respondents.
Besides the language used, the words used for formulating the questions need to be
carefully selected considering all respondents having a different background. The use
of academic and technical words are required being avoided, hence ensuring everyone
being able to understand the purpose of the question. It should also be considered
that some respondents do not know what Android, locking mechanism, or pattern lock
is. It should be visualized, explained, as well as provide practice for the respondents
needing it. None of the respondents should leave the survey feeling stupid or insecure
as a cause of a poorly designed application. The participant should leave the survey
with a positive experience.
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R2 - Trustworthiness
Gaining trust is important for getting people to wanting to participate. When being
asked to take part in a study, respondents might ask several questions regarding the
reliability of the source. For example, are the data being used for the right reasons
and handled according to what are being specified in the survey?
When respondents open the survey, a description of the research and the researcher
should be provided. It is reasonable to provide contact information, as well as
information about myself so participants able to read about the person asking them
to participate. The survey should being placed on a sub-domain on my personal
domain for gaining trust from the respondents. My personal domain is marteloge.no,
containing the sub-domain survey.marteloge.no for the survey. The contact information
is also important in terms of ownership of data. When linking to my web page, the
respondents can see who are in the possession of the collected data. Who are reading
the data and how is it handled? It should be clearly stated that the information
collected are only available to the research group containing myself, my supervisor,
and my co-supervisor. It should be clearly stated that the data gathered only will be
used for research purposes.
The visual appearance is an important part of gaining trust from the respondents.
This is explained as an own requirement.
R3 - Environment of use
When collecting data, the environment should be considered because it can impact the
data in terms of introducing bias. When looking at the Android Unlock Pattern, the
scheme is best known for being used on mobile devices like smartphones and tablets.
When looking at different characteristics of mobile devices, tablets and smartphones
should be defined as two separate environments of use. First, the tablet are often used
in various settings than a smartphone that a user carry and use every day. Second,
the physical interaction are often different. A smartphone are smaller than a tablet
and can be interacted with by using one hand. When collecting data, it is desired
to capture specific characteristics of the environment a pattern were created. As a
cause of different characteristics with the interaction on smartphones and tablet, it is
desirable only to collect data from one the environments. The Android Lock Pattern
are most commonly used on smartphones, making this study only collecting data for
this particular environment.
R4 - Complexity and length
Since the only option for answering the survey are by using a smartphone, the time
used for complete the survey, as well as the complexity, needs to be configured. The
smartphone have a limited ability for interaction where the small touch screen are the
only interaction available.
For ensuring that people completes the survey, the questions needs to be short and
concise formulated, as well as being easy to answer. As a cause of using smartphones
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for data collection, the number of questions might need to be reduced. The questions
should also be prioritized according to their importance in case some respondents leave
the survey before completion. It is better to get some data than nothing at all; each
provided answer to a question should directly be stored after submission.
R5 - Visual appearance
The visual appearance of a system is not only being related to a design preference but
are also related to other aspects like psychology. To be asked to create patterns can
for some respondents be a daunting task as it is related to security.
To avoid respondents having a bad experience by visiting the survey, several design
requirements should be used for ensuring a pleasant experience while answering the
survey. Firstly, use bright colors that are calming. The use of colors is not related
something friendly. Secondly, the use of icons can be welcoming. The use of icons,
especially icons of a childish touch should be used for giving a good experience, hence
avoid scaring off potential respondents.
R6 - Navigation
The use of a smartphone as a platform requires navigation to be easy and intuitive
to use. When evaluating the usability of a system, the number of clicks used for
reaching a goal can be used. The navigation should in some way be automatic when
the participant selects their answer to avoid too much of a time used for navigating.
However, when sending the respondent to a new state, the transformation should be
intuitive without the respondent losing track of the state. As well as being fast, the
navigation should clearly visualize the selected answer before changing any content.
The number of questions and the scope of a survey are essential information when
deciding to participate or not. To signalize the number of questions, a progess bar of
some extent should be included in the survey.
R7 - Security
Since the survey is required to be anonymous for ethical concerns, the communication
should be transferred over an encrypted channel using SSL. Using SSL avoid the
probability of someone monitoring the traffic. The use of SSL does also provide the
requirement for anonymity, as well as a visual appearance of the implemented security
mechanisms. The use of SSL provides the secure HTTP (HTTPS) flag in the navigation
bar, helping to build upon the trustworthiness of the survey. Security is also a part of
being trustworthy.
On the backed of the application, all logging and traces of the users should not be
stored. An IP address is a piece of information that can be used to trace the position
of the user, hence should not be stored in any terms. The only data stored form the
survey should be the answers provided by the participants. Besides turning off any
logging as well as using SSL, other security measures should be implemented to obtain
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a secure application. The application should be reviewed by someone with a high
competence in information security before starting the data collection. It is not desired
to lose any data, or a situation where someone can steal the data in any terms. If any
cookies are used, it should be clearly stated in the introduction. The introduction
should also include a description of any security related information concerning a
respondent.
4.2 Layout and Structure
The layout and design were first drafted in my specialization project in 2014, and
the first wireframes can be found in Appendix A. Since the first drafts were made, a
technical implementation and redesign have been carried out. Last section included an
elaboration of the requirements of the survey while this section will go a step further
and describe the survey and its functionality in use.
The survey can be divided into three unique parts; introduction, pattern creation,
and background information. All three parts are being described in detail throughout
this section. All figures of the application in this section are pictures of the actual
application used for collecting data.
4.2.1 Introduction
When entering the survey on a smartphone, all users will be presented with an
introduction to the survey, the research, and the author. The survey will not start
collecting any data before a visitor decides to participate by pressing "Start Survey",
as illustrated in Figure 4.1(c). When the visitor clicks on the green button, the visitor
becomes a participant in the study. Figure 4.1(d) is the first screen in the survey,
explaining how the Android Pattern Lock works. It is important to give a brief
explanation to users not familiar with the Android Pattern Lock while at the same
time avoid giving too much information causing any bias.
Figure 4.1(d) shows the next path in the survey; either enter the training mode or
skip the training mode. If a respondent has never used the Android Pattern Lock
before, there is added a training mode. Such training mode can avoid uncomfortable
situations where the user is getting the feeling of being tested for something they’re
not managing. The training mode is an opportunity for the participant to play with
the pattern without feeling any pressure to perform. The training mode is also an
opportunity for collecting extra data in an another context than the three patterns
types obtained later in the survey.
Patterns created in the training mode can be as valid as the other pattern types
collected later in the survey. The patterns created in training mode might be the first
patterns that pop into the respondent’s mind, hence avoiding respondents to trying to
overcompensate as a cause of being under pressure. As far as this research know, there
are not found any research on how people think when asked to create a password or
being asked to give away a password. It is believed that asking people to "give away"
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a password or pattern will introduce the effect of people overcompensating by creating
longer passwords than typically created.
Figure 4.1(e) shows the training mode. When creating a pattern, the view will give
feedback to the respondents according to the rules specified in Figure 4.1(d). In the
training mode, the participant can create as many patterns as they like by pressing
the "Retry" button. For leaving the training mode continuing with the survey, the
respondents clicks the "continue" button. The respondents entering the training mode
are asked the same questions as the participant selected the "Skip training" in Figure
4.1(d).
(c) Start screen (d) ALP introduction (e) Training mode
Figure 4.1: Survey screens
4.2.2 Pattern Creation Process
After introducing the research and the Android Pattern Lock, it is time to start
collecting the three main selected patterns types; shopping account, smartphone, and
banking account. The reason for dividing the pattern collection process into three
separate patterns is to put the pattern creation into a context. The decision to add
three patterns also works as a preventive measure for avoiding data being submitted
by respondents just trying to finish the survey as fast as possible.
By introducing three separate pattern types instead of only one type, can introduce
both positive and negative effects. When asking respondents to create a pattern for
other types than its intended environment, some people might be confused. The choice
of asking people to create a pattern for a banking account can for someone be an
uncomfortable situation, might causing respondents to leave the survey. By asking
the participants to create three patterns instead of one pattern takes more time and
requires more attention and creativity from the participant. When asking respondents
to create three patterns can introduce a situation where some respondents are creating
the same pattern for all pattern types.
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In the survey, respondents are asked to create a pattern for a shopping account, a
smartphone, and a banking account. The three types are being carefully selected of
how people would categorize different situations from a security point of view. As
mentioned, the three pattern types are introduced to set the pattern creation process
into context, avoiding dishonest attempts for answering the survey.
When collecting the patterns, it is desirable to copy the pattern creation process
used by Android. The process consists of two steps: create a pattern of at least four
connected dots, after that retype the same pattern for completing the process. Figure
4.2 shows the pattern creation process from a real Android smartphone. First, the user
selects a pattern of at least four connected dots as illustrated in Figure 4.2(a). Second,
after creating a pattern, the user are asked to retype the same pattern as illustrated in
Figure 4.2(d). If the redrawn pattern was correctly typed, the pattern creation process
are finished. The pattern creation process used in the survey are visualized in Figure
4.3 and 4.4.
(a) Draw pattern (b) Pattern recorded
(c) Redraw pattern (d) Confirm new pattern
Figure 4.2: The Android pattern creation process
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Figure 4.3: Pattern creation workflow
1. The first step is tp draw the pattern. The patter are drawn by connecting the
nodes on the grid creating lines between the nodes (Figure 4.4(d)). The user will
not be able to proceed before a valid pattern is drawn.
(a) If the pattern is a valid pattern, the pattern turns green, and the message
"pattern recorded" are shown. After, the user are able to press the "Continue"
button to proceed to step 2 (Figure 4.4(f)).
(b) IIf the pattern not being valid pattern, the pattern turns red, and the
message "Connect at least 4 dots" are shown (Figure 4.4(e)). The user can
press the button "Retry" for redrawing a new pattern.
(c) If a pattern drawn is a valid pattern, but the user want to create a different
pattern, the user can always press the "Retry" button to reset the pattern
already created.
2. When the respondent has created a valid pattern in step 1, they are proceeded to
step 2 for redrawing the created pattern. The view is very similar to the view in
step 1 beside the buttons and the text (Figure 4.4(g)).
(a) If the user successfully redraws the pattern from step 1, the pattern turns
green, and the message "Correct!" appears as in Figure 4.4(i). The user
can complete the pattern creation process by clicking the green button
"Continue" to proceed to step 3 and complete the pattern creation process.
(b) If the user unsuccessfully manages to redraw the pattern cerated in step
1, the pattern turns red, and the message "Not the same pattern" appears
(Figure 4.4(h)). The user can try to remember the pattern and try to draw
again. A situation like this can appear when the user do not remember the
pattern or incorrectly draws the pattern.
(c) If the user do not remember the pattern created at all, the "Back" button
can be hit to go back to step 1 where the user are able to recreate a new
pattern.
3. When the user successfully redraws the pattern in step 2, the pattern is successfully
created.
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(a) Introduction to patterns (b) Shopping pattern (c) Smartphone pattern
(d) Bank pattern (e) Pattern length too short (f) Valid pattern recorded
(g) Retype pattern
@
(h) Retype wrong (i) Retype correct
Figure 4.4: Survey - Create and retye patterns
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4.2.3 Background Information
After going through the pattern creation process for the three pattern types, the
respondent will now be asked several questions about their mobile and personal
characteristics. Figure 4.5 shows screenshots from the survey application and the
questions asked. The views in Figure 4.5 is the final design used used for collecting data.
The changes made during the design and implementation are described in Section 4.3.
There are some core functionality implemented in these questions that is important to
notice. First, the traditional list of alternatives are replaced by icons. As discussed in
Section 4.1, it is important to customize the interface for easy interaction on a mobile
touchscreen. The images used are easy to interact with because of its size, and it
requires less text because of the semantic meaning of the icons used. The icons used in
the survey has been tested in a own usability test that are described later in Section
4.3.1. Second, to keep the user motivated, a progress bar is added to the views. The
questions are listed after their appearance in the survey. Not all the questions are
visualized in figure 4.5, but all will be described in in detail in this section.
The first questions to be asked is the handsize of the respondent, ranged from small to
extra large as visualized in Figure 4.5(a). The question is a subjective categorization,
and there is no way of doing any countermeasures for avoiding wrong classification.
There is often a difference in hand size of genders, so the question is asking the
respondents to categorize the size of their hand according to their gender. By specifically
asking for hand size based on gender will give a more precise answer. The male
respondents claiming to have a small hand will probably have a bigger hand compared
to female respondents claiming to have a the same size.
Figure 4.5(b) and 4.5(c) are the handedness of the respondent and the size of the
screen used, respectively. Whether a person should be straight forward, where your
dominant are either left- or right-hand. Screen size has the same problem as asking
for the hand size, because how a respondent categorizes the screen size depends on
the subjective evaluation made by the respondent. A countermeasure for having the
possibility to evaluate respondents categorization of the screen sizes is to store the size
of the screen in pixels. The task of storing the pixel width and height of the screen
are stored automatically when the respondent selects the screen size.
Figure 4.5(e) and 4.5(d) is questions asking for the hand and finger used for creating
the patterns. Typically, a respondent will either use their left or right hand for holding
the smartphone while interacting with the screen by using either the forefinger or
the thumb. The option of using another finger than forefinger and thumb are also
applied. Instead of using words like thumb and forefinger, a circle is applied to a hand
indicating the finger used.
Figure 4.5(f) are asking about the reading and writing direction preferred by the respon-
dent. The three alternatives includes a small example to avoid any misinterpretation
of the icons. Figure 4.5(g), 4.5(h), and 4.5(i) are asking about the respondent’s gender,
age, and experience with IT and security. The alternatives for gender are visualized by
using a male and female icon. The last question asks whether the respondent have any
experience with IT and security. The screens missing from Figure 4.5 are the question
asking for the screenlock the respondent use, country, and the last screen thanking the
respondents for participating.
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(a) Handsize (b) Handedness (c) Screen size
(d) Hand used when creating
pattern
(e) Finger used (f) Reading/writing direc-
tion
(g) Gender (h) Age (i) Experience
Figure 4.5: Survey - Questions
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There is one special question in the survey that is not being mentioned until now;
the mobile operating system used. This question is one of the hard questions to ask
because it is no intuitive way for asking about the operating system of a mobile without
using any technical terms.
Instead of listing all the possible mobile operating systems for mobile devices, the mobile
operating system of the mobile is detected and visualized. In other words, the survey
checks for the mobile OS and present what is being detected. With this information, a
generic question like "Is this your mobile operating system?", hence avoiding a long
list asking "Which one is your mobile OS?". The alternatives presented, Yes, No,
and Don’t know, are designed in way that the answer provided by the respondent are
valuable whatever they select. For each mobile OS, each corresponding alternative are
stored as mobileOS_yes, mobileOS_no, and mobileOS_unknown.
When the OS have been detected, one of the screens in Figure 4.6 will show. It is
implemented support for four different mobile operating systems that are covering
the majority of the operating systems on smartphones: iOS, Android, Windows, and
BlackBerry. Each OS will have the three alternatives yes, no, and question mark.
One pitfall is the formulation of the question. I should avoid any formulations stating
that I detects their information. A question like "It is detected that you have an
Android phone. Is this correct?" can be daunting, hence causing the respondents the
feeling of being monitored. The feeling of someone knowing anything about you can
be scary for anyone not knowing the technical details. The mobile operating system
are easily detected on the client side with one line of code with JavaScript.
(a) iOS (b) Android (c) Windows
Figure 4.6: Survey - Mobile OS
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Figure 4.7 shows an example of what happens when the respondent clicks on an icon.
When an icon is being press, the icons are highlighted by turning green like in Figure
4.7(a). When an icon is being clicked on, a slow fading effect starts for indicating
the state changes to the next question. The fading effect are visualized in Figure
4.7(b) and 4.7(c). When the question is faded out, the next question appears. The
fading effect implemented is a cause of the described navigation requirements stated
in Section 4.1. By using the automatic navigation while clicking on an image, the
highlighting and the fading effect supports the respondent keeping track of the state.
If a view is not utilizing icons, the fading effect is still used for indicating a change of
state.
(a) Select icon (b) Icon fading out (c) Icon faded out
Figure 4.7: Survey - Icon selecting effect
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4.3 Usability Testing of the Survey
The usability of the survey was being tested before starting collecting data for different
purposes. First, when sending out the survey, there is no much room for changing the
layout and content of the survey. The layout and content should be looking the same
for all respondents. A change in the formulation or a change in the layout can cause
respondents to interpret a question differently. Second, the survey is in a non-controlled
environment, meaning that knowing who the participants are and where they are from
are not known. The questions and layout needs to be created as universal and as
intuitive as possible. The questions, the flow, and the graphical elements should be
intuitive across different countries and cultures.
The usability testing is divided in two main parts: usability testing in a controlled
environment and usability testing in an uncontrolled environment. Beside the specific
usability tests performed, it has also been performed testing on the selected icons as
well as the wireframes created in the preliminary work /citeforprosjekt. A summary of
usability test of the icons will be provided in this section. The usability test performed
on the wireframes provided in Appendix A resulted in the first implemented version
being tested in this study.
4.3.1 Testing the Icons
As a described in the requirements, respondents should be able to understand and
interpret the questions correctly regardless of the language spoken. As a cause of the
requirement, icons were chosen to be used instead of using text. If the icons should
work as intended, the icons should be properly tested.
When testing the icons, the goal is to get the participants in the test to interpret what
being asked for by only looking at the icons. In other words, the respondents had to
guess the formulation of the question by looking at the icons. The test was performed
by using all the icons selected for the survey. The test were performed on 12 students;
5 female and 7 male students.
All the respondents managed to guess the questions asked for most of the questions to
some extent. Each attempt had some variations but were considered to be correctly
enough for passing. When the icons are used in the survey, the question is provided.
Some of the participants had some problem interpreting the different locking mech-
anisms in the screen asking for the locking mechanism currently in use, especially
the slide-to-unlock. Some of the questions used a question using the alternatives with
a green check mark, and a red cross mark indicating the answer no. For the check
mark and the cross, the respondents were asked to interpret thir purpose. All of the
respondents either categorized the icons as "agree/disagree" or "yes/no".
54
4.3.2 Testing the Survey in a Controlled Environment
To perform a usability test in a controlled environment, meaning that one responsable
person have set up an environment being observable, as well as that person being
present. The test was conducted in a quiet meeting room by testing 10 students, 5 boys
and 5 girls from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology. The participants
had different background, but the majority were studying Computer Science.
To ensure the test was being conducted in an environment close to how the survey
works, they brought their own device and they were not being told much about the
research. All the participants got the same introduction and instructions of how the
test worked:
1. The participant were asked to speak aloud during the test and tell what they
were thinking and reason about their choices.
2. The participants were told that the test was not testing their ability to finish
the test.
3. The participants were explained that they could quit the test if they felt uncom-
fortable
After giving an introduction to the test, the participant got the URL to the survey,
and they were asked to start whenever they felt ready. In the list below there is
listed comments from the participants that was stated during the test. The following
statements listed below were useful statements from the persons testing the application.
The statements are either useful comments provided during the test or observation
might causing a need for doing changes in the application:
"How do I get back if I press a wrong answer?"
One of the persons asked how it was possible navigating back to a previous question
if a wrong answer were being selected. The participant expected a button working
similar to an undo button for being able to undo a wrong answer.
"Too many icons on the screen for representing different screen locks"
The person did find it confusing with all the icons representing the different screen
locks. The participant also found it hard to interpret and select the intended screen
lock. As this caused problems, the respondent would like this being presented in an
another way, hence eliminate the ambiguity and confusing visualization by using too
many icons. One suggestion was to add a description to each of the icons or to replace
the icons using a list with only text.
"I need to choose a pattern that is hard to guess for the banking account!"
Most of the participants used more time creating a pattern for a banking account than
for the other patterns. Some of them also commented that they did spend more time
creating this than the other patterns because they felt the need for creating protecting
their banking account more than for the other types. It was also noticeable that
the participants used more time thinking before creating the pattern for the banking
application. Some of the respondents also acknowledged that they used a pattern for
smartphone that they had used or were currently using.
"Do I choose the size of my hand based on my gender?"
Four of the participants was uncertain on how to categorize the size of their hand.
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Some of the participants commented on whether they selected their hand size based
on their gender or categorizing the hand based on unisex sizes.
"Tody, my smartphone would probably be categorized as a medium smartphone"
The question is by definition subjective, but there is no easy for asking this differently.
The provided answer might depend on the person’s technical experiences with smart-
phones. Today, most of the smartphones would be categorized as a medium size, while
older smartphones would probably fall into the category small size. For avoiding any
ambiguities, an new solution should be found ensuring quality in the data collected.
"I expected to type the pattern after creating the pattern"
One of the participants expected to be asked to retype the pattern. The respondent
did not have any preferences of when the patterns should being asked to be retyped.
Two suggestions was to either copy the pattern creation process of Android or asking
the respondents to recreate the patterns at the end of the survey.
"I do read from left to right, but I do also read lines from top to bottom."
Three of the participants either was unsure what the question asked about or did not
understand the icons used. The view should be redesigned to avoid any ambiguities in
the presentation. One provided from the respondents was to used examples next to
the icons.
"The last question about my experience with IT and security took a while to understand."
The question was long and complex. Many of the participants used a long time
interpreting the question and some of them asked me during the test if they had
understood the question correctly. The formulation should be changed for avoiding
such situation.
4.3.3 Testing the Survey in an Uncontrolled Environment
Observation of incoming data is not a typical usability test but is rather a quality check
to see whether the collected data is reasonable. When sending out the survey without
being present, it is important to validate the incoming data to see if any respondents
have any problems related to completing the survey or interpret the questions. As a
test, the survey was first distributed to a small group of selected people from Norway
(ISO country code ’NO’).
When looking through the data, it was observed that one person were registered
rare and small country in Africa with the ISO country code starting with ’N’. It is
reasonable that this was a typing error or something wrong with the component used
in the question. The component used in the question was a third party dropdown list
with a flag icon for each country. It were observed that the component used were using
a long time loading the flag, hence lagging while the respondents interacted with the
component. The component should be changed and optimized to avoid such situation.
The majority of the people asked to participate in an early release were living in
Scandinavia, hence having a reading and writing direction from left to right. When
looking through the collected data, 2 out of 25 respondents had selected otherwise.
Based on statistics, there should only be persons with reading and writing direction
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from left to right. One assumption is that the icons used are being ambigiuos, hence
interpreted wrong.
Besides looking at the data, I received feedback by email from some respondents
answering the survey for testing purposes. They commented that the dropdown were
lagging, as well as being confused when selecting the screen lock they were currently
using.
4.3.4 Changes Made to the Survey
Before distributing the survey there were conducted two types of tests providing useful
insight of how the users experienced the application. The tests were crucial because
of the high need for high-quality data collected from the survey. Any ambiguities or
errors causing bias in the data are not wanted. This section will provide information
on all changes made to the application as a result of the observations and the feedback
from the tests.
1) Country dropdown
In both tests, there were many participants that unintentionally selected the wrong
country because the dropdown component lagged. The component used had a flag
attached to the country name that used many resources for loading, causing the users
experiencing the component to be slow. The component was changed, and the flag
icons were removed. Figure 4.8(a) and 4.8(b) are showing the old and the new version
of the country component, respectivley.
(a) Old view (b) Final view after changes
Figure 4.8: Changes in country selection view
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2) Experience question
The question was rather complicated and hard to read. The question was changed
from "Do you work with or study/studied IT and/or security full time?" to "Do you
have a background in IT/Security?".
3) Reading and writing direction
The first version of the survey just listed three different icons of arrows indicating
the reading and writing direction, but it seemed that people misinterpreted the icons.
This view was changed by adding a description next to the arrow to remove any
misinterpretations of the icons. The old and the new presentation of the question are
shown in Figure 4.9(a) and 4.9(b), respectively.
(a) Old view (b) Final view after changes
Figure 4.9: Changes in reading/writing direction view
4) Apply time used into creation of patterns
It was observed that some of the participants in the usability test in the controlled
environment was spending more time creating the pattern for banking account. During
the test, it was not easy to track the time used on different tasks, but this can be
implemented in the application for observing the time used for creating a pattern of a
spesific type. The observation from the test was that some of the participants took
their eyes off the screen thinking harder about the pattern they wanted to create for
the banking account. In this test, I was present and could observe such situations, but
are not possible when distributing the survey. Such time frame can also be used in the
analysis. An example of use could be to eliminate dishonest attempts causing bias in
the data.
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5) Selection of screenlock
The first version of the view had a list of all the screen locks that are provided on the
majority of the smartphones. Based on feedback, the participants found it confusing
to select the correct screen lock for several reasons.First, some of the participants did
not understand all the icons used. Second, it was observed that some of the users did
not interpret all the alternatives and selected the first matching alternative. Third, it
seems that some had a screen lock that could be categorized as several of the presented
icons, making it hard to pick the correct one. The new version of the view replaced all
the icons with a drop-down listing all the alternatives. When the user selects a screen
lock, an image or description appears below the dropdown, giving an extra layer of
confirmation of the selected screen lock. The alternative "PIN" was also changed from
"PIN" to "PIN (4-digits)" for eliminate any ambiguities for those using more than four
digits. Figure 4.10(a) and 4.10 are the old view and the new view, respectively.
(a) Old view (b) Final view after changes
Figure 4.10: Changes in screenlock selection view
6) Changing handsize question
Based on feedback from the test conducted in the controlled environment, the partici-
pants did not know what to compare their hand size to. The size selected depended
on whether they compared themselves to their gender or not. For being consistent, the
question explicitly stated in the question that the user should select their size based
on their gender.
7) Adding pattern retype
During the tests, it was received feedback that many of the participants expected to
be asked to retype their selected patterns. Two suggestions from the respondents were
to copy the process used on Android devices or asking respondents to retype in the
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end of the survey. It is not desired to ask users to retype their patterns at the end of
the survey because such situation can make respondents feeling if not being able to
remember the pattern. As stated in the requirements, respondents should not leave
the survey with a bad experience. If asking the respondents to retype the pattern at
the end of the survey, this should be clearly stated before creating the patterns. By
stating that the users should remember the patterns for being able to complete the
survey could cause respondents feeling uncomfortable or even cause the respondents
to leave the survey. The best solution was to copy the same process that Android are
using.
8) Collecting screen pixels of screen used
By observing the participants in the first test, it was observed that the selected choice
in patterns was different from person to person. Since this question is a subjective
meaning of the person answering, an extra layer of information is applied to the dataset
by saving the pixels width and height of the screen. One problem with pixels size
of a mobile screen is that they do not match the physical size of the screen. The
pixels could still provide information for being able to categorize the size correctly by
comparing the OS and pixels to the respondents answer.
9) Shuﬄe the ordering of the patterns
One concern with asking the users to create the patterns in a predefines order as
discussed until now, respondents might be influenced by the order of the patterns.
To be sure that the ordering is not introducing bias, a method named Latin Square can
be used. A Latin Square is a table filled with n different symbols in such a way that
each symbol occurs exactly once in each row and exactly once in each column. Instead
of using three different orderings, all possible combinations of the three pattern types
will be used. This results in 6 different ways of ordering the patterns.
By using the Latin Square, it ensures that the ordering do not impact the respondent’s
choice of patterns. Or in other words, the data can be validated afterwards to see if
the ordering have affected the collected data. In practice, respondents will create the
same patterns, but in a different order.
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4.4 Ethical Considerations
My research is performed by collecting demographics and other information about
the respondents and the devices used. The data are not by definition considered to
be sensitive information, in other words, the information can not be linked back to
the respondent. It is still important to evaluate the work being done for avoiding
conducting research not considered being ethical. As this research are collecting
user-selected patterns, a set of countermeasures have been implemented for ensuring
anonymity of the respondents.
Before the survey starts, the respondents are informed about the purpose of the research
and how their contributed data will be managed. Respondents are also advised that
they have the right to leave the survey whenever wanted. The questionnaire should be
entirely anonymous, and the identity and location of the respondent should not be
possible to track back to the respondent. As the selected sampling technique supports,
a list of respondents is not kept in any form as the respondents participate voluntarily
if receiving the survey. Other measures applied are turning off the logging of the IP
addresses on the server side. The application are made by the researchers and for this
research in particular. Therefore, no third part is included or have access to the data,
making it possible to ensure anonymity.
Before collecting data, it is required to get an allowance for collecting data from the
NSD, in Norwegian called Personvernombudet for forskning [27]. The NSD is the
privacy ombudsman for approximately 150 research and educational institutions in
Norway, where NTNU is one of them. The research was reviewed and accepted by the
supervisor of this project and the NSD contact person from NTNU.
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5 | Results
This chapter presents the results provided by the collected data from the survey.
Section 5.1 is a overview of the population while Section 5.2 and 5.3 looks at the
results with respect to entire population and different subgroups, respectively. Section
5.4 is the last section including a description of how the data were preprocessed before
being analyzed. The subgroups included in Section 5.3 are gender, age, handedness,
experience with IT and security, hand size and screen size. For the subgroups, a simple
two-tailed t-test are performed to test a significant difference in two samples looking
at pattern length and visual complexity.
The results in Section 5.2 and 5.3 are divided into pattern creation time, pattern
length, and visual complexity. The pattern creation time is the time used for creating
a pattern, recorded from the start when the grid appeared until the user submitted the
pattern. The pattern length are defined as the number of dots used to form a pattern.
Each dot has an own sequence number and can only appear once. The minimum length
of a pattern is 4 dots while the maximum length is 9 dots. The number of unique
patterns of all possible pattern lengths is described in Table 2.1. The pattern length
are visualized in two different ways; the average pattern length and the distribution
of pattern length. Pattern complexity, e.g. pattern strength, is calculated from a
mathematical formula that utilizes the visual aspects of patterns. The formula and
parameters used are described in detail in Section 2.6. In short, the formula uses the
size (number of nodes), physical size (length) of the pattern, number of intersections
and number of overlaps. The minimum strength is 6.340 and the maximum strength
is 46.807.
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5.1 The Population
This section will be a summary of the population as well as information about the
data collected. The presented results are aggregated from the data gathered from the
survey described in Chapter 4.
5.1.1 Number of Respondents
Table 5.1 summarizes of the number of respondents and level of completeness. Some
respondents just opened the survey without providing any information, while other
answered all questions. A total of 802 respondents completed the whole survey. 11
people created patterns and started answering question before leaving the survey and
204 respondents started creating patterns, but did not answer any other question.
At last, 81 respondents entered the survey and left without creating any pattern or
answering any questions.
Completed the survey 802
Stoped during the survey 11
Started creating patterns 204
Opened the survey 81
Table 5.1: Number of respondents
5.1.2 Demographics and Background Infromation
Figure 5.1 summarizes the populating by looking at gender, handedness, experience
with IT and security, and reading/writing orientation.
The majority of the respondents was male, where 529 of the respondents were male,
and 278 respondents were female. In total, 66% of the population consist of male
respondents while 34% of the population consist of female respondents. By looking at
handedness of the participants, 88% of the population were right-handed, and 12%
were left-handed.
The percentage of left-handedness in the world is hard to estimate, but it is stated
that one in ten people are are left-handed [21]. The frequency of left-handed people
seems reasonable compared to the frequency of left-handed respondents in the survey
that was 12% of the population.
To be able to distinguish between people with experience with IT and Security it was
asked about the participants experience in the survey. The majority had a background
in IT and security constituting 59% of the population, while 41% of the respondents
did not have a background related to IT and security.
It is hard to reach people outside your own network, especially to reach groups of
people with other cultures. In the dataset, it was only 2% that had an another reading
and writing direction than left-to-right. Countries operating with a reading and writing
direction other than left-to-right are Arabic countries or countries located in Asia.
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The reading and writing direction can therefore not be used in any further analysis
because the number of participants is too low for obtaining any significant results.
Male: 529 (66%)
Female 278 (34%)
Right: 690 (88%)
Left: 97 (12%)
Experience: 470 (59%)
No experience: 332 (41%)
Top-to-botto: 7 (1%)
Right-to-left: 8 (1%)
Left-to-right: 792 (98%)
Figure 5.1: Gender, handedness, experience with IT and security,
and reading/writing orientation
Figure 5.2 presents a distribution of the respondents’ age. The respondents are divided
into 8 intervals: under 20, 20-24, 25-29, 31-34, 35-39, 40-49, over 50. The three last
intervals have a lower frequency of participants, hence being grouped into smaller
intervals. The distribution have a peak at the interval 20-24. Reasons for the skewed
distribution can be a cause of the network that received the survey. The majority of
the networks contacted were students in their twenties, hence resulting in a skewed
distribution. When looking at the right-hand side of the graph, there is a lower
frequency of respondents.
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Figure 5.2: Age distribution
Figure 5.3 is the overview of the hand size of the respondents. The registered hand
size is considered to be subjective and needs to be carefully used when making any
conclusion. The majority of both genders classified their hand size according to
their gender as a medium size. Male respondents have a higher frequency of large
classifications. A more detailed quality control of the provided dataset of selected
hand sizes will be carried out in Chapter 5.3.5.
Figure 5.3: Handsize
The survey asked the participants about their country of origin and the population
ended up being represented by 39 countries. The majority of the countries represented
in the dataset was Norway and United States of America as seen in Table 5.2. The table
summarizes all 39 countries, as well as the frequency of respondents from each of the
countries. The distribution can not be used for making any conclusion of selection of
graphical passwords based on the country of origin, as many of the countries represented
in the population do not provide sufficient mounts of data. During the data collection
it was a goal to avoid a homogeneous dataset. The majority of the participants is still
from Norway, but is was important to get other countries represented as well to obtain
as a more heterogeneous data set.
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Country # Respondents
Norway 517
United States of America 115
Germany 33
Czech Republic 31
United Kingdom 22
Russia 13
Denmark 7
Sweden 6
Switzerland 6
Australia 5
Netherlands 4
Chile 4
Finland 3
Austria 3
Ukraine 3
China 3
Afghanistan, Mexico, North Korea, Pakistan, Viet-
nam, Luxembourg, Ireland, Tunisia
2
Italy, Greece, Belgium, Indonesia, Malaysia, Bahrain,
Botswana, Argentina, Singapore, japan, Canada,
South Korea, Hungary, Turkey, Brazil
1
Table 5.2: Respondents country of origin
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5.1.3 Screen Lock Habits and Mobile Device Used
Table 5.3 summarizes the respondents habits when selecting screen lock, particularly
their use of screen lock mechanisms, and which screen lock they are currently using.
The table also lists information about the mobile device used for answering the survey,
like screen size and mobile operating system. The table provides as an overview of
how the respondents manage the security on their smartphones.
The majority have answered the survey using a mobile running on Android or iOS
that are the two most popular mobile operating systems in the market. Together, 98%
of the mobile operation system used were either Android or iOS, constituting 58% and
40% of the smartphones, respectiveley.
A total of 65% of the participants had used the Android Pattern Lock before while 35%
of the population were not familiar with the Android Pattern Lock. The respondents
not familiar with the utilization of the Android Pattern Lock will probably have their
first time using the scheme in this survey.
Looking at the screen lock habits in the population, 82% of the participants uses screen
lock on their mobile device. Among the listed screen locks in Table 5.3, the majority
are using either 4-digit PIN (36%), Android Pattern Lock (31%) and fingerprint (18%).
The fingerprint is only available on iOS while Android Pattern Lock are not allowed
on iOS. Beside the different screen locks, the mobile devices do also have different
screen sizes. The stated screen size by the respondents is a subjective classification
of the screen size. Further validation of the screen size and classification of correct
physical size are being found in Section 5.3.5.
Screenlock in use
Android Pattern Lock 202 31%
4-digit PIN 237 36%
Fingerprint 116 18%
Password 44 7%
slide-to-unlock 28 4%
Other 28 4%
Screensize
Small 108 13.3%
Medium 532 65.4%
Large 173 21.3%
Mobile Operating System
Android 464 58.0%
iOS 321 40.0%
Windows 16 1.9%
Blackberry 1 0.1%
Use screenlock
Yes 655 82%
No 149 18%
Used Android Unlock Pattern
Yes 526 65%
No 278 35%
Table 5.3: Information about password habits and mobile device used
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5.1.4 The Created Patterns
This section is looking at the patterns created, and how the patterns were being created
due to the hand and finger used. Table 5.4 summarizes the number of patterns created
of the different pattern types. There is about the same abount of patterns created
for all pattern types. The cause of not having the exact number of each pattern is
because some of the respondents did not complete answering the entire survey as listed
in Table 5.4.
The number of training patterns are larger than for the other pattern types because
the respondents were able to create as many pattern as they liked. A total of 658,
constituting 80% of the population, created at least one pattern in training mode.
The total number of patterns collected for shopping account, smartphone, banking
account, and training was 3393 patterns. The distinct number of pattern created for
the different types as summarized in Table 5.4.
On the right side of Table 5.4, a summary are provided of how the respondents created
the patterns. By observing normal interaction with a smartphone, the majority of
people fall under two main categories in how to interact with a smartphone:
1. Use one hand using the thumb for interaction, whereas the hand are defined by
handedness.
2. Use the opposite hand defined by handedness and use the forefinger on the other
hand for interacting with the screen.
There are also people interacting with the screen using other fingers than the thumb
and forefinger, hence provided an option for selecting otherwise. The majority of the
respondents was either using their right hand using their thumb or using their left
hand and their forefinger. Handedness may influence these numbers, hence provided
more information of the pattern creation process in Section 5.3.3 by lookig futher at
handedness, hand used, and finger used.
Patterns created
Shopping 841
Smartphone 842
Bank 838
Training 872
Total 3393
Hand and finger used
Left hand Forefinger 233 28.8%
Left hand Thumb 60 7.4%
Right hand Forefinger 72 8.9%
Right hand Thumb 398 49.3%
Other 45 5.6%
Table 5.4: Information about the collected patterns
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5.2 Findings for the Entire Population
This section will go through the results from the survey based on the entire population.
The results will at first look at pattern creation time, pattern length, and visual
complexity as described in the introduction. The section will also provide other results
found when going through the data for the entire population.
5.2.1 Pattern Creation Time
Figure 5.4(a) gives the pattern creation time in seconds for the three pattern types. By
looking at the average creation time for patterns, patterns created for bank accounts
have the highest creation time of 9.42 seconds while patterns created for smartphones
have an average creation time of 8.24 seconds.
Figure 5.4(b) shows the average pattern creation time in seconds for respondents
experienced with the Android Unlock Pattern. The graph reveals that both patterns
created for shopping account and banking account are not affected by the participants
experience with the Android Unlock pattern.
Patterns created for smartphones have a lower response time for patterns created
by respondents experienced with the Android Lock Pattern. Patterns created for
smartphones by experienced respondents had an have an average creation time of
7.20 seconds while the patterns created for smartphones by unexperiences respondents
had an average creation time of 8.40 seconds. The difference in average creation time
results in a difference of 1.2 seconds.
(a) Average pattern creation time (seconds) (b) Creation time and experience with ALP
Figure 5.4: Pattern creation time for the entire population
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5.2.2 Pattern Length
Figure 5.5(a) summarizes the average nodes selected to form a pattern for the each
distinch pattern type. The average length is 5.54, 5.40, and 5.92 for patterns created
for shopping accounts, smartphones, and bank accounts, respectively. The patterns
created for bank accounts have a higher average length than patterns created for
shopping and smartphone. The numbers from the graph also show that patterns
created from smartphone has the smallest average pattern length. The difference in
average pattern length for patterns created for smartphones and banking accounts are
on average 0.52 nodes. Patterns created for shopping accounts are slightly longer than
patterns created for smartphones but constitute not a significant difference between
the two types.
(a) Average Pattern Length (nodes) (b) Pattern length distribution
(c) Pattern length and type distribution
Figure 5.5: Pattern Length for the entire population
The graph in Figure 5.5(b) is a pattern length distribution indicating what pattern
length that are more often selected by the population. Figure 5.5(c) is a more detailed
version of Figure 5.5(b), showing the pattern distribution for all pattern types. Both
graphs give an indication the respondents selecting patterns having a length longer
than 5 nodes less often. Both graphs in Figure 5.5(a) and 5.5(b) contains a low
frequency of pattern with length 8, where patterns of length 7 and 9 both have a
higher frequency than patterns of length 8.
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The pattern created for shopping account and smartphones in Figure 5.5 have the
majority of the patterns distributed over the shortest pattern lengths, e.g. patterns of
length 4 and 5. Patterns created for banking accounts had the highest average pattern
length, but the majority of the patterns created for bank accounts have still a length
of 4 or 5.
5.2.3 Pattern Complexity
Table 5.5 is a summary of all the parameters used in calculating the strength of the
patterns created by the entire population. The pattern length is not being further
described as it was covered in the previous Subsection. The pattern length are named
Size when talking about the length for calculating the visual complexity.
The physical length are increased when patterns utilize lines between the nodes that
not are horizontal or vertical. A longer length are often correlated with the number of
intersections and overlaps. Patterns created for bank accounts have the highest strength
and highest occurrences of intersections and overlaps, 0.433 and 0.023 respectively.
Patterns created for banking account also have a high pattern creation time and a
high average pattern length. The average strength of patterns created for banking
account are 15.514, also being the highest average strength score compared to the
average score obtained by the two other types.
Parameters Shopping Smartphone Bank All
#Patterns 841 842 838 2521
Avg. Size 5.541 5.398 5.920 5.619
Avg. Length 5.050 4.920 5.666 5.212
#Intersections 177 149 363 689
Avg. Intersections 0.210 0.1769 0.433 0.273
#Overlaps 15 12 19 46
Avg. Overlaps 0.0178 0.014 0.023 0.018
Avg. Strength 13.440 12.837 15.514 13.928
Min strength 6.340 6.340 6.340 6.340
Max strength 44.441 43.187 44.441 44.441
Table 5.5: Pattern strength for all patterns types in the entire population
The smartphone is the pattern type with the weakest average strength. The character-
istics of patterns created for smartphones is that they have a short pattern length in
terms of number of nodes as well as a short physical length. The average occurrences
of intersections and overlaps remain the lowest compared to patterns created for bank.
The average number of occurrences of intersections and overlaps are 0.1769 and 0.014
respectively. The patterns created for smartphones gets an average strength score
of 12.339, being the lowest score compared to the average score obtained by the two
other types. Patterns created for shopping account are similar to patterns created
for smartphones. All the parameters for patterns created for shopping accounts have
slightly higher parameter values than for smartphone, hence a slightly higher average
strength of 13.440.
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When looking at the maximum pattern strength of all patterns collected, none of
the patterns obtained a maximum score of 46.8. In other words, none of the roughly
800 respondents managed to create a pattern obtaining a higher complexity score
than 44.44. The set of patterns created for smartphones did include a pattern having
obtained a complexity score higher than 43.187, being a lower score than for the two
other types
5.2.4 Association Elements
An association element is something a person know or recognize, and can used as an
element to ease the process of remembering a password. This is a known technique
used by users when creating alphanumeric passwords and PIN codes. Alphanumeric
passwords are often known being created containing personal information like names
and dates for support the creator in remembering the password. The same strategy
are being observed for PIN codes where the use of codes forming a date often occurs.
The dataset collected in this research are being scanned for patterns corresponding to
association elements. By going through the alphabet, it was found 12 types of patterns
corresponding to the visual representation of letters from the alphabet. Out of the
12 letters, 9 patterns had a significant number of appearances. Figure 5.6 shows the
8 most common patterns having the same visual representation as letters from the
alphabet. Beside the letters C, L, M, N, O, S, U and Z, letters like G, J and W also
appeared in the data set.
By iterating through the sequences corresponded to letter, 385 out of 3393 patterns
in the dataset matched a letter. The number of patterns matching a letter from the
alphabet constitutes 11.4% of the collected patterns.
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(a) The letter C (b) The letter L (big) (c) The letter L (small)
(d) The letter M (e) The letter N (f) The letter O
(g) The letter S (h) The letter U (i) The letter Z
Figure 5.6: Most frequent patterns forming letters from the alphabet
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5.2.5 Bias in the Selection of Start Node
The selected starting node of a pattern is crucial information when analyzing patterns.
Knowing the starting node limits the number of possible patterns because a legal
pattern can only visit the same node twice. When knowing the likely starting points,
patterns starting with less likely starting nodes can be excluded from the theoretical
password space.
Table 5.6 summarizes the likelihood of starting in a particular node for each of the
four pattern types. The numbers notation used in Table 5.6, 1-3 and T, denotes a
shortcut for shopping account, smartphone, banking account and training, respectively.
On average, 44% of all patterns starts in node 1, e.g. the upper-left corner.
The training patterns are not included in other parts of the results because there
are no control over how many times a person have entered a tarining pattern. The
training pattern are still valid when looking at the starting node because it reflects
where respondents starts creating patterns.
Start node All 1,2,3 1 2 3 T
1 44% 42% 43% 41% 42% 51%
3 15% 15% 16% 14% 13% 14%
7 14% 14% 13% 15% 14% 13%
2 9% 9% 10% 9% 8% 7%
4 6% 7% 6% 7% 7% 6%
5 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 3%
9 4% 4% 3% 3% 5% 3%
8 2% 3% 2% 3% 3% 2%
6 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 2%
Table 5.6: Selection of starting node for all pattern types
Figure 5.7(b) is a graphical representation of the likeliehood of starting in the different
nodes. Each node has a number, starting from node 1 in the upper left corner ending
up with node number 9 as shown in Figure 5.7(a). All nodes in Figure 5.7(b) are
colored based on the likelihood of being selected as a starting point from high to low
(green - blue - orange), whereas the green nodes are the most common starting points
and orange nodes is the least common starting points.
Summarizing the most common starting points, node 1, 2 and 7, they all together
constitutes 73% of the patterns. The different pattern types have all over 40% of the
patterns starting in the upper left corner. There are some nodes that are having a less
probability of being selected as a starting point. The nodes with the lowest frequency,
node 5, 6, 8 and 9, only have a total probability of 12% for being selected as the
starting node.
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(a) Node positions (b) Staring node for all pattern types
Figure 5.7: Node position and likely starting point for all pattern types
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5.2.6 3-gram Movement Patterns
This section includes a visualization of 3-gram movement patterns from the collected
patterns. A 3-gram is a sub-sequence of a pattern consisting of 3 nodes. The notation
used uses a circle when denoting the start of a 3-gram while the arrow denotes the end
of the 3-gram. A 3-gram does not indicate whether a pattern starts or end. A 3-gram
can appear at the start, at the end or in the middle of a pattern because a 3-gram
is only a subsequence of a pattern. By iterating through all patterns by counting all
possible 3-grams, a list of the commonly 3-grams are visualized as seen in Figure 5.8.
The three figures contains top 20 common occurrences of 3-grams, ordered from the
most commonly used (blue) to less commonly used (orange).
Figure 5.8: Most common 3-gram to less common 3-gram
Based on the observed bias in the selection of starting node, it is interesting to use
information about the selection of starting node together with the observed 3-gram
movement sequences. By looking at top 100 most commonly created patterns, the
patterns top 100 patterns constitutes 42% of the collected patterns. When looking
at top 120 patterns, roughly 50% of the patterns in the data set are covered. In
general, when studying the movements sequences in Figure 5.8, most of the patterns
are straight lines close to the edges. Diagonal lines are not used very often, whereas
straight diagonal lines are the once appearing more often. 3-grams not being a straight
line or curving the corners does rarly occur. An example of such 3-gram is the sequence
189.
The 3-gram with the highest frequency is the 3-gram 123 and 147, appearing in 1055
of the created patterns. Besides having a subsequence of the most frequent 3-grams,
844 of the collected patterns either started with the sequence 123 or 147.
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5.3 Findings in Specific Subgroups
This section is a presentation of the results focusing on different user types. Each
section is being dedicated to one user type having one of the human properties stated in
the research questions in Chapter 1. Each section will include the same parts; pattern
length, pattern creation time, and pattern strength. For some of the user types, extra
pattern characteristics are included if some unexpected results were observed.
This section includes the results from a two-tailed t-test for testing the statistical
significance of the results, as well as including the mean, the standard deviation, and
the P-value. The t-test are being conducted on the length and visual complexity for
all subgroups. A statistical significant result tells that the patterns from two samples
are different, e.g. the choice in patterns are different. All tests are using a significance
level of 0.05. As a result of using a two-tailed test, results getting a p-value less than
0.025 are a statistical significant result.
5.3.1 Gender
Gender are being divided into the subgroups of male and female participants. For
each of the parts in presented, the results will be presented with respect to pattern
type and gender.
Average pattern creation time
Figure 5.9 shows the average creation time in seconds for both genders. Male par-
ticipants have in general a higher average creation time than females. The average
creation time for shopping account is the only pattern type where male participants
uses shorter time than the female participants for creating a pattern.
(a) Male (b) Female
Figure 5.9: Average pattern creation time for gender
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Average pattern length
Figure 5.10(a) and 5.10(b) presents the average pattern length for patterns created
by male and female participants, respectively. When looking at the patterns created
shopping accounts and smartphones by male participants are having a slight difference
in average length. The patterns created for smartphones have the lowest average
pattern length of 5.47, while patterns have the longest average pattern length of 6.09.
Female participants have roughly the same average length, 5.26 and 5.27, for patterns
created for both shopping accounts and smartphones, respectively. The patterns
created for banking accounts have the highest average length of 5.57. Comparing
the average pattern length for patterns created by both genders, both genders have
the longest length for banking account and the shortest average length created for
smartphones. In general, the patterns created by male participants have an longer
average length than patterns created by female participants.
(a) Male (b) Female
Figure 5.10: Average pattern length for gender
Table 5.7 summarizes the results when performing a two-tailed t-test for testing the
difference in pattern length for patterns created by male and female respondents. The
results reveal a significant difference in patterns created for shopping accounts and
banking accounts.
Pattern type Type Mean SD P-value Result
Shopping Male 5.68 1.76 0.00048841 SignificantFemale 5.26 1.55
Smartphone Male 5.47 1.60 0.08616198 Not significantFemale 5.27 1.49
Bank Male 6.09 1.86 0.00009069 SignificantFemale 5.57 1.72
Table 5.7: Statistical significance for pattern length and gender
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Pattern length distribution
Figure 5.11 shows the pattern length distribution for both genders. The differences
between the genders are noticeable in the endpoints, e.g. patterns with length 4 and 9.
The male participants have a higher frequency of patterns with a longer length while
the female participants have a higher frequency of patterns with a short length. The
average number of patterns created with a length between 5 and 8 are about the same
for both genders.
(a) Male
(b) Female
Figure 5.11: Average pattern length distribution for gender
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Pattern complexity
Table 5.8 summarizes the patterns strength for the three pattern types for both genders.
Patterns created by female participants have the characteristics of infrequent use of
both intersections and overlaps for all types. The patterns created for smartphones
by female respondents did not have a single pattern including an overlap, while only
three patterns created by female respondents included an overlap.
None of the patters created by female respondents reached the maximum strength
score. The highest strength score reached for patterns created by female respondents
was 40.072. The the patterns with the lowest pattern strength are patterns created
for smartphones by female participants, only reaching a total strength score of 32.078.
The patterns created by male respondents had a higher frequency of both intersections
and overlaps, hence a higher average strength score for patterns created by male
respondents.
Shopping Smartphone Bank
Parameters Male Female Male Female Male Female
#Patterns 529 278 529 278 529 278
Avg. Size 5.684 5.263 5.465 5.270 6.089 5.572
Avg. Length 5.225 4.687 5.034 4.720 5.927 5.154
#Intersections 147 20 120 23 284 69
Avg. Intersections 0.278 0.072 0.227 0.082 0.537 0.248
#Overlaps 13 1 12 0 16 3
Avg. Overlaps 0.025 0.04 0.023 0 0.030 0.011
Avg. Strength 14.127 12.062 13.221 12.122 16.398 13.744
Min strength 6.340 6.340 6.340 6.340 6.340 6.340
Max strength 44.442 32.950 44.442 32.078 44.442 40.072
Table 5.8: Pattern strength and gender
Table 5.9 summarizes the results when performing a two-tailed t-test for testing the
difference in pattern strength for patterns created by male and female respondents.
The results reveal a significant difference in patterns created for all pattern types.
Pattern type Type Mean SD P-value Result
Shopping Male 14.13 8.02 0.00008596 SignificantFemale 12.06 6.48
Smartphone Male 13.27 7.46 0.02153682 SignificantFemale 12.12 6.31
Bank Male 16.40 9.11 0.00001588 SignificantFemale 13.74 7.74
Table 5.9: Statistical significance for visual complexity and gender
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5.3.2 Age
The participants are being divided into divided into seven age intervals; under 20,
20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-49, and over 50.
Average pattern creation time
Figure 5.12 is the graph visualizing the average creation time for each pattern type
created by the different age groups. In general, patterns created for banking accounts
have the highest average creation time across the various age groups. The average
creation time seem to increase slightly as the age increases. It is noticeable that
the creation time for smartphone patterns differs from the two other pattern types,
especially for the younger participants where pattern creation time for smartphone are
significantly lower.
Figure 5.12: Pattern creation time by age
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Average pattern length
Figure 5.13 shows the pattern length for the three pattern types by the different
age groups. In the graph, the average pattern length goes slightly down as the age
increases. As the age increases, the average length of the all pattern types evens out.
The age groups having the highest difference in pattern length is the patterns created
by the youngest and the oldest respondents.
Figure 5.13: Pattern length by age
Table 5.10 summarizes the results when performing a two-tailed t-test for testing the
difference in pattern length for patterns created by respondents with an age under
25 and respondents with a age of 25 years or older. The results reveal a significant
difference in patterns created for shopping accounts and banking accounts.
Pattern type Type Mean SD P-value Result
Shopping Under 25 5.74 1.76 0.00318325 Significant25+ 5.38 1.64
Smartphone Under 25 5.43 1.56 0.496001184 Not significant25+ 5.36 1.56
Bank Under 25 6.19 1.91 0.0001225 Significant25+ 5.69 1.74
Table 5.10: Statistical significance for pattern length and age
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Pattern complexity
The visual complexity of the patterns created by the different age groups are found in
Table 5.14. To be able to illustrate the pattern strength for all age groups the data
are shorten down to just visualize the pattern strength of each pattern type created
by the different age groups. As mentioned earlier, the younger age respondents the
longer patterns are created. The same is with the strength. The youngest age group
have about twice as hight average pattern strength than the oldest age group. As the
age increases, the strength of the different age groups also evens out. In general, bank
have the highest average strength score while patterns created for smartphones have
the lowest average strength score across the different age groups.
Figure 5.14: Pattern strength and age distribution
Table 5.11 summarizes the results when performing a two-tailed t-test for testing the
difference in pattern strength for patterns created by respondents with an age under
25 and respondents with a age of 25 years or older. The results reveal a significant
difference in patterns created for shopping accounts and banking accounts.
Pattern type Type Mean SD P-value Result
Shopping 14.43 8.14 0.00089041 Significant12.61 7.00
Smartphone 12.95 6.88 0.59266007 Not significant12.68 7.10
Bank 16.95 9.36 0.00002946 Significant14.32 8.04
Table 5.11: Statistical significance for visual complexity and age
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5.3.3 Handedness
This section includes the results from studying left- and right handed respondents and
their choice of patterns.
Average pattern creation time
Figure 5.15 is the average creation time for patterns with respect to the handedness of
the respondents. A participant can either be left or right handed. By looking at the
graph, right-handed respondents has a lower average creation time than left-handed
respondents. The only exception is the patterns created for smartphones where left-
handed respondents have a slightly higher average creation time. For both left-handed
and right-handed respondents, the average creation time for the banking account has
the highest average creation among the three pattern types.
(a) Right-handed (b) Left-handed
Figure 5.15: Average pattern creation time for handedness
Average pattern length
Figure 5.16(a) and 5.16 presents the average pattern length for patterns created by left-
and right-handed, respectively. In general, both left- and right-handed respondents
have about the same average pattern length. One exception is the patterns created for
smartphones where there is a slight indication of left-handed people creating shorter
patterns than right-handed people. The average pattern length for patterns created
for smartphones created by right- and left-handed respondents are 5.42 and 5.28
respectively. The patterns that are getting the highest average length is the patterns
created for banking accounts with an average pattern length of 5.93 and 5.90 for right-
and left-handed respondents respectiveley.
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(a) Right-handed (b) Left-handed
Figure 5.16: Average pattern length for handedness
Table 5.12 summarizes the results when performing a two-tailed t-test for testing the
difference in pattern length for patterns created by left- and right-handed respondents.
The results reveal no significant differences for any of the pattern types.
Pattern type Type Mean SD P-value Result
Shopping Left 5.42 1.75 0.47066079 Not significantRight 5.56 1.70
Smartphone Left 5.28 1.60 0.40381003 Not significantRight 5.42 1.56
Bank Left 5.90 1.99 0.86996995 Not significantRight 6.93 1.81
Table 5.12: Statistical significance for pattern length and handedness
Pattern length distribution
Figure 5.17 shows the pattern length distribution for both right- and left-handed
respondents. The selection of pattern length seems to have no significant difference
beside left-handed respondents having a tendency of having more patterns of length
4 than than right-handed respondents. It is also noticeable that the frequency of
patterns tends to go down as the pattern length goes up. The only exception are
patterns with length 8 where patterns with length 7 and 9 have a higher frequency.
A pattern length of 4 and 5 can be considered as a short pattern, whereas the minimum
pattern length for Android Pattern Lock is 4. By looking at the number of patterns
with the minimum length, 45% of the left-handed respondents created a pattern of
length 4 for smartphones. In total, 70% of all left-handed respondent created a pattern
of length 4 or 5 for smartphones while 65% of the patterns created for smartphones
by Right-handed respondents is of length 4 or 5. Compared to patterns created for
banking accounts, there are only 51% and 52% of the patterns having a length of 4
or 5 for right- and left-handed respondents, respectively. This resulr in a difference
of 15% and 20% for right- and left-handed respondents between patterns created for
smartphone and banking accounts of length 4 and 5.
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(a) Right-handed
(b) Left-handed
Figure 5.17: Average pattern length distribution for handedness
Pattern complexity
Table 5.13 is the pattern strength for each pattern type with respect to the handedness
of the respondents. The table does also include an overview of the parameters used
for calculating the pattern strength.
The number of intersections differs on both shopping account and smartphone when
comparing the patterns created by left- and right-handed respondents. The only
pattern type having an equal number of intersections between right- and left-handed
respondents are patterns created for banking accounts, resulting in 0.443 and 0.433
average number of intersections. Left-handed respondents have approximately an
equal number of intersections for both shopping and bank, but only half the number
half as many intersections for patterns created for smartphones. Patterns created by
right-handed respondents has an approximately equal distribution of intersections on
patterns created for shopping account and smartphones, but about twice as many
occurrences of intersections on patterns created for banking accounts.
Comparing the number of overlaps, left-handed respondents have only one occurrence of
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overlap in one of the patterns created for banking accounts. Right-handed respondents
have a somewhat higher number of overlaps, but overlaps still rarely occur. The
pattern type reaching the highest number of overlaps and intersections are the patterns
created for banking accounts.
By comparing average strength for both right- and left-handed respondents, the
strength is roughly the same. In general, pattern strength has an indication to be
higher for patterns created for banking accounts, but there are no significant differences
caused by handedness. Looking at the maximum pattern strength reached, both right-
and left-handed respondents had reached a maximum pattern strength of 44.441 that is
the same as the maximum pattern strength in the entire dataset. For patterns created
for smartphones, the maximum strengths for both right- and left-handed respondents
were 43.187 and 37.280 respectiveley.
Shopping Smartphone Bank
Parameters Right Left Right Left Right Left
#Patterns 690 97 690 97 690 97
Avg. Size 5.560 5.423 5.423 5.280 5.932 5.897
Avg. Length 5.036 5.134 4.966 4.781 5.703 5.566
#Intersections 126 42 124 18 306 42
Avg. Intersections 0.183 0.433 0.180 0.186 0.443 0.433
#Overlaps 14 0 12 0 18 1
Avg. Overlaps 0.020 0.0 0.017 0.0 0.026 0.010
Avg. Strength 13.455 13.360 12.966 12.339 15.601 15.339
Min strength 6.340 6.340 6.340 6.340 6.340 6.340
Max strength 39.827 44.441 43.187 37.280 44.441 44.441
Table 5.13: Pattern strength and handedness
Table 5.14 summarizes the results when performing a two-tailed t-test for testing the
difference in pattern strength for patterns created by left- and right-handed respondents.
The results reveal no significant differences for any of the pattern types.
Pattern type Type Mean SD P-value Result
Shopping Left 13.36 8.64 0.9176142 Not significantRight 13.46 7.46
Smartphone Left 12.34 7.29 0.4271685 Not significantRight 12.97 7.03
Bank Left 15.34 9.50 0.7970912 Not significantRight 15.60 8.67
Table 5.14: Statistical significance for visual complexity and handedness
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Typing habits
Handedness is a human characteristic influencing the physical interaction with a
smartphone, hence might having an impact on the way a person create a pattern.
The only way a person are interacting with a smartphone is by using their hands,
making this an important behavior to study. The hand used are also being defined by
handedness, making it interesting to look at the typing behavior of both.
Table 5.15 and 5.16 summarizes the typing habits of the respondents focusing on the
physical interaction with the touch screen. The parameters included are handedness,
hand used to hold the smartphone, and the finger used to type the pattern. Table 5.15
are summarizing the typing habits of right-handed respondents while Table 5.16 are
summarizing the typing habits of left-handed respondents.
The two main options for interacting with a smartphone are described in Section
5.1.4. By starting looking at the right-handed respondents, the majority (53%) are
interacting with the screen as described in category 1. This means that the 53% of
the right-handed respondents used their right hand and their thumb, e.g. used only
one hand, for interacting with the screen. About 32% of the right-handed respondents
interacted with the screen as described in category 2. In other words, 32% of the
right-handed respondents used their left hand to hold the smartphone while using
their forefinger on their right hand for interacting with the screen. The last 15% of the
right-handed respondents had other typing habits than the two most common ways of
interacting with the screen.
The left-handed respondents had a more indefinite typing habit because none of the
alternatives appear to be more common than others. By summarizing the numbers,
it seems that the frequency of category 1 and 2 for left-handed respondents have no
significant difference in number of respondents. 26 respondents are in category 1 and
26 respondents are in category 2. Another observation is that 22 of the left-handed
respondents interact in the same way as Category 1 for right-handed respondents.
Only 5% of the right-handed respondents acts in the same way as Category 1 for
left-handed respondents. In other words, the typing habits of right-handed respondents
seems to be more predictable than as for the typing habits of left-handed respondents.
Hand used Finger used #
Right hand
Thumb 366
Forefinger 41
Other 8
Left hand
Thumb 33
Forefinger 217
Other 23
Table 5.15: Right-handed typing habits
Hand used Finger used #
Right hand
Thumb 22
Forefinger 26
Other 6
Left hand
Thumb 26
Forefinger 10
Other 4
Table 5.16: Left-handed typing habits
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Bias in the Selection of Start Node
How a person are holding a smartphone might impact the nodes being reachable. It is
defined two main types of typing a pattern, e.g. either use one or both hands. When
using both hands, one hand are used to hold the phone while the other hand are used
for interacting with the screen. When holding the smartphone in one hand, the same
hand are used for both holding and interacting with the screen, whereas the thumb
are the only finger available when using one hand. Figure 5.18 are showing likelihood
of starting nodes from patterns created by respondents with different dominant hand,
combined with the two ways of holding a smartphone and finger used. Figure 5.18(a)
and 5.18(b) are looking at right-handed respondents’ selection in starting node for
patterns created by using either one or two hands, respectively.
Figure 5.18(a) are showing the choice of starting nodes for patterns created by right-
handed respondents holding the smartphone in the right hand using the thumb on
the same hand for pattern creation. As seen in Figure 5.7, node 1, 3, 7 are the most
common choice for selecting starting node. Figure 5.18(b) are the selection of starting
node by right-handed respondents using their left hand holding the smartphone using
their right forefinger for pattern creation. The three main starting nodes are 1, 3, and
7, similarly for the right-handed respondents using one hand.
Figure 5.18(c) are showing the selection of starting nodes for patterns created by
left-handed respondents holding the smartphone in the left hand using the thumb on
the same hand for pattern creation. About 54% of the left-handed respondents using
one hand starting their pattern in node 1. The majority of the left-handed respondents
using one hand starts their pattern on the left side of the grid. The nodes in Figure
5.18(d) are starting points selected by left-handed respondents using the right hand
for holding the smartphone while interacting with the screen using the forefinger on
the left hand.
By comparing handedness and way of creating the patterns, the way of holding the
smartphone, either using one or two hands, do not seem to affect the node starting
node. For all ways of creating a pattern with respect to handedness, the majority of
the patterns are created by starting on the left side of the grid.
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(a) Patterns created by right-handed respon-
dents holding the smartphone in the right hand
using the thumb on the same hand
(b) Patterns created by right-handed respon-
dents holding the smartphone in the left hand
using the forefinger on the left hand
(c) Patterns created by left-handed respondents
holding the smartphone in the left hand using
the thumb on the same hand
(d) Patterns created by left-handed respondents
holding the smartphone in the right hand using
the forefinger on the left hand
Figure 5.18: Starting node based on handedness, hand used to hold smartphone, and
finger used used when creating patterns
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5.3.4 Experience with IT and Security
This section takes a more detailed review of the patterns created by people with a
difference in experience with IT and security. The level of interest, and experience with
IT and security, can cause people to create different passwords due to risk perception
and security awareness.
Average pattern creation time
Figure 5.19 is showing the average creation time measured in seconds for both respon-
dents experienced and not experienced with IT and security.
Figure 5.19(a) are showing the average creation time for the three pattern types
created by respondents experienced with IT and security. The patterns with the
highest creation time are the patterns created for banking accounts with an average
creation time of 9.42 seconds. The patterns with the lowest average creation time are
being created for smartphones with an average creation time of 7.75 seconds.
Figure 5.19(b) are showing the average creation time for the three pattern types
created by respondents inexperienced with IT and security. The patterns with the
highest creation time are the patterns created for banking accounts with an average
creation time of 9.29 seconds. The patterns with the lowest average creation time are
being created for smartphones with an average creation time of 7.42 seconds.
Comparing the respondents experienced and inexperienced with IT and security, the
inexperienced respondents has a slightly slower response time for pattern creation for
all three pattern types.
(a) Experience with IT and security (b) No experience with IT and security
Figure 5.19: Average pattern creation time for experience with IT and security
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Average pattern length
Figure 5.20(a) are showing the average pattern length for patterns created by respon-
dents experienced with IT and security. The patterns with the highest average pattern
length are being created for banking accounts with a total average pattern length of
6.11. The pattern type with the shortest average pattern length are patterns created
for smartphones with an average pattern length of 5.48. Figure 5.20(b) are showing
the average pattern length for patterns created by respondents inexperienced with IT
and security. The patterns with the highest average pattern length are being created
for banking accounts with a total average pattern length of 5.61. The pattern type
with the shortest average pattern length are patterns created for smartphones with an
average pattern length of 5.27.
The trends in the graphs show that respondents with experience in IT and security
create longer patterns than people inexperienced with IT and security for all three
pattern types. For both graphs, patterns created for banking accounts has the highest
average length while patterns created for smartphones have the shortest average pattern
length.
(a) Experience with IT and security (b) No experience with IT and security
Figure 5.20: Average pattern length for experience with IT and security
Table 5.17 summarizes the results when performing a two-tailed t-test for testing the
difference in pattern length for patterns created by respondents being experienced
and inexperienced with IT and security. The results reveal a significant difference in
patterns created for banking accounts.
Pattern type Type Mean SD P-value Result
Shopping Experienced 5.64 1.72 0.038204664 Not significantInexperienced 5.39 1.66
Smartphone experienced 5.48 1.60 0.064560991 Not significantInexperienced 5.27 1.50
Bank Experienced 6.11 1.86 0.000083188 SignificantInexperienced 5.61 1.74
Table 5.17: Statistical significance for pattern length and experience with IT and
security
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Pattern length distribution
Figure 5.21(a) is the distribution of pattern length for patterns created by respondents
experienced with IT and security. For the patterns created for smartphones, 70% of
the patterns constitutes of patterns with a lower length, e.g. patterns with a length
between 4 and 6. For patterns created for banking accounts, 62% of the patterns
are created having a low length. The created patterns having a length of 9 nodes
are the patterns created for banking accounts. Figure 5.21(b) is the pattern length
distribution of patterns created by respondents inexperienced with IT and security.
For the patterns created for smartphones, 79% of the patterns are patterns having a
low length.
By comparing the pattern length distribution for experienced and inexperienced
respondents, the patterns created by inexperienced respondents have a higher frequency
of patterns with lower pattern length than patterns created by experienced respondents.
The difference observed is that experienced respondents create fewer patterns of low
length for banking accounts compared to inexperienced respondents. Instead of having
a high frequency of short patterns, patterns created by experienced respondents have a
higher frequency of patterns with length 9 for banking accounts. Experienced users do
only have 27% of their patterns for banking accounts created with the length 4, while
inexperienced users have 39% of their patterns for banking accounts created with the
length 4. Both graphs show that the lower the length a lower frequency of the pattern
length occurs.
(a) Experience with IT and security
(b) No experience with IT and security
Figure 5.21: Average pattern length distribution for experience with IT and security
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Pattern complexity
Table 5.18 is a summary of the parameters used for calculating the pattern strength
for each pattern type with respect to the respondents experience with IT and security.
Patterns created by experienced users seems to have a higher frequency of both
overlaps and intersections, hence reaching a higher average strength score for all
patterns created by experienced respondents. The patterns created for smartphones,
by both experienced and inexperienced respondents, was the patterns getting the
lowest strength score.
By comparing average strength for both experienced and inexperienced respondents,
the patterns created by experienced respondents have obtained the highest average
strength. Looking at the maximum pattern strength, neither the experienced or the
inexperienced respondents manage to create a pattern reaching the maximum pattern
score for the dataset.
Shopping Smartphone Bank
Parameters Yes No Yes No Yes No
#Patterns 470 332 470 332 470 332
Avg. Size 5.636 5.386 5.479 5.274 6.113 5.605
Avg. Length 5.182 4.818 5.045 4.753 5.919 5.281
#Intersections 123 41 108 34 231 121
Avg. Intersections 0.262 0.123 0.230 0.102 0.491 0.364
#Overlaps 10 4 9 3 13 6
Avg. Overlaps 0.021 0.012 0.019 0.009 0.028 0.018
Avg. Strength 13.911 12.635 13.271 12.202 16.417 14.089
Min strength 6.340 6.340 6.340 6.340 6.340 6.340
Max strength 44.441 39.827 43.187 38.870 44.441 44.441
Table 5.18: Password strength and Experience with IT/Security
Table 5.19 summarizes the results when performing a two-tailed t-test for testing the
difference in pattern strength for patterns created by respondents being experienced
and inexperienced with IT and security. The results reveal a significant difference in
patterns created for all three pattern types.
Pattern type Type Mean SD P-value Result
Shopping Experienced 13.91 7.78 0.01699014 SignificantInexperienced 12.64 7.19
Smartphone Experienced 13.32 7.40 0.02375298 SignificantInexperienced 12.20 6.52
Bank Experienced 16.42 8.94 0.00015740 SignificantInexperienced 14.09 8.26
Table 5.19: Statistical significance for visual complexity and experience with IT and
security
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5.3.5 Hand Size and Screen Size
To be able to analyze if there is a correlation between hand size and choice of graphical
patterns, the data collected needs to be validated due to the subjective form. Along
with the hand size, the screen size and finger can also be an interesting factor to
look at. When using a survey, there is no good way of asking respondents for their
classification of their hand size, hence a need for validation to decide whether the data
are reliable for further use.
Figure 5.22 are visualizing the frequency of each hand size for all respondents. Table
5.20 are summarizing the respondents classification of the size of their hands with
respect to the gender of the respondents. Based on own experiences, there is a difference
in how the two genders will classify the size of their hand. In society, men are supposed
to be masculine where big hands are often being associated with masculinity. The
opposite of masculine, femininity, can be associated with smaller hands. It is therefore,
believed that the majority of the male respondents will classify their hand as medium
or large while the majority of the female respondents will classify their hand as small
or medium. The question asked in the survey were asking the participants to classify
the size of their hands based on their gender. Table 5.20 confirms that the majority of
the male respondents classified their hand as a medium size or higher, while female
respondents classified the size of their hand as medium or lower.
Figure 5.22: Handsize of all participants
Xtra Large Large Medium Small Total
Male 45 (9%) 200 (38%) 246 (47%) 38 (7%) 529
Female 3 (1%) 54 (19%) 157 (56%) 64 (23%) 278
Table 5.20: Handsize and gender
The problem with using data being a subjective classification by the respondents,
it is not known if the classification is correct. On the other side, what is a correct
classification? The hand size of the respondents are not used for further analysis
because of the difficulties of comparing the size selected by both genders against each
other. If used, any results can not be guaranteed to be correct if including the hand
size. The hand size property will are not being used further in this research.
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In the survey, both the subjective classification of the screen size as well as the height
and width in pixels were collected. Classification of screen sizes is troublesome due to
the various screen sizes and resolutions across different devices. Smartphones operating
on Android are known to have a high variation in screen resolutions while Apple have
created their devised with a smaller and fixed number of different screens. The physical
size of a mobile screen is not correlated with the pixel size because a pixel is not a
physical measure due to resolution, hence being troublesome to obtain the correct
screen size.
Besides screen size and pixels, the respondents were asked for the mobile operating
system on the device used. As a result of Apple having standardized the screen of
their devices makes it possible to obtain the physical size of the screen for respondents
using a iPhone for answering the survey. Figure 5.23 is the complete list of the devices
provided by Apple and the corresponding size in inches.
(a) iPhone 3.5" (b) iPhone 4" (c) iPhone 4.7” (d) iPhone 5.5”
Figure 5.23: iPhone screen resolutions
There are only four sized used by Apple mobile devices as illustrated in Figure 5.23.
In the dataset, there are only obtained the pixel sizes of the devices. For the devices
running on iOS, four different types were observed in the dataset. The respondents’
classification of the screen sizes, as well as the pixel size, are summarized in table 5.24
for all respondents using an iPhone.
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Figure 5.24: iPhone screensize distribution
To be able to evaluate the provided classification from the respondents, the Apple
devices are classified according to what this research defines as a small, medium
and big screen. The classifications are listed in Table 5.21 with the corresponding
device and pixel sizes. To be able to evaluate the provided classification from the
respondents, the Apple devices are classified according to what this research defines
as a small, medium and big screen. The classifications are listed in Table 5.21 with
the corresponding device and pixel sizes. When comparing Figure and 5.24 and Table
5.21, the respondents agree on the size to some extent. When looking at the number
of respondents, only 40% of the respondents used an iPhone, making the provided
data for each screen type hard to use for further analysis.
Iphone Model Resolution (px) Inches Size
iPhone 2G, 3G, 3GS, 4, 4s 320 × 480 3.5” S
iPhone 5, 5s 320 × 568 4” M
iPhone 6 320 × 568, 375 × 667 4.7” M/L
iPhone 6 Plus 375 × 667, 414 × 736 5.5” L
Table 5.21: iPhone screensizes
Based on the classification of the screen size on Apple devices, it can be used for
evaluating respondent’s ability to classify what this research defines as a small, medium
or big screen. The problem with the rest of the respondents not using Apple products
is that there is no fixed standard for screen sizes, making it impossible to predict the
physical size by knowing the pixels. Since the majority of the respondents were using
an Android device (58%), making it unlikely of being able to classify the screen sizes
correctly. The 40% of the devices being an iPhone was possible with some uncertainty
to classify, but the size of the dataset are too small for getting any results. Either
being an Android or iOS device, it can neither be guaranteed to be correctly classified.
It is therefore decided to not include any results using the screen size.
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5.4 Preprocessing and Validation of Collected Data
When collecting data, it is important to preprocess the data before analyzing the data.
One of the reasons for preprocessing the data is, for example, to find an outlier in the
data. An outlier can impact the data to not show the correct results. For example,
when going through the pattern creating time, some of the respondents had used over
10 hours for creating a pattern. The high response time causes noise in the data and
is declared as outliers, meaning that the response will be removed from the dataset.
Figure 5.25 is a plot of the pattern creation time, using time intervals of 1 seconds and
number of occurrences. When time goes up to 30 seconds, the frequency goes down.
In a normal situation, a pattern does not take a long time to type. It was therefore
decided only to use the patterns being created within 30 seconds, as a pattern time
higher do not represent a normal situation. Besides the time used, there was no need
for preprocessing the other data and were used as is.
Figure 5.25: Defining max pattern creation time
It was mentioned that is was used different pattern orders for different respondents.
The different orderings were applied to ensure that an ordering was not impacting the
choice in patterns. When comparing the time used, the length of the patterns, and
visual complexity, there were no significant difference between the patterns created
when creating patterns in a different order. Figure 5.26 visualises the number of
respondents having the different pattern orderings. The specific orders are specified
using the numbers 1 to 3 corresponding to patterns created for shopping accounts,
smartphones, and banking accounts, respectively.
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Figure 5.26: Percentage of times the pattern orders occurred
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6 | Discussion
This chapter is a discussion of the results presented in Chapter 5. The first six sections
corresponds to the first six research questions from Chapter 1 focusing on choice in
passwords and human properties. Section 6.7 are discussing the results when looking
at the entire population. Section 6.8 discusses the results from a context of use
perspecitive. The last section is a disussion of the limitations of this research.
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6.1 Age and Choice of Graphical Passwords
When testing the significance of the length and complexity for different age groups, the
test distinguished two groups; under and over 25 years. The tests revealed that there
is a significant difference in pattern length and visual complexity for patterns created
for shopping accounts and banking accounts. The respondents under 25 created longer
patterns as well as patterns with a higher visual complexity for banking accounts and
shopping accounts. There was no significant difference in length and the complexity of
patterns created for smartphones.
Before starting to analyze the results, it was not expected that the respondents under
25 years would create longer and more complex patterns than the respondents over
25. It was rather being expected that the respondents over 25 years created longer
and more complex patterns as they might, for example, use the mobile device for work
purposes where a strict security policy is often required. A factor that may cause the
difference in complexity and pattern length is that the respondents under 25 have
owned a mobile device when growing up. Knowing how to use a smartphone might
make younger respondents more prepared for creating stronger passwords as they
might be more familiar with the utilization of a smartphone. As far as this research is
familiar with, no other research has been found regarding the selection of password
particularly looking at age.
6.2 Gender and Choice of Graphical Passwords
By comparing the patterns created by male and female participants, there was a
significant difference in patterns created. The results revealed a significant difference in
patterns created for shopping account and banking accounts when testing the pattern
length. When testing the visual complexity of the patterns, there was a significant
difference in the created patterns for all pattern types. The results prove as evidence
that male participants create longer patterns with higher visual complexity compared
to the patterns created by female respondents.
By studying the choice of length, female participants had a higher frequency of patterns
of length four and at the same time had a lower frequency of patterns of length nine
as opposed to male participants. When looking at patterns with length five up to
eight, both genders have the same frequency. There is therefore a difference in how
frequently male and female participants select the minimum and the maximum pattern
length. One factor that may be involved is that many of the male participants are
experienced with IT and security while fewer of the female respondents have the same
experience.
By studying the visual complexity of the patterns created by the two genders, it is
observed that none of the female participants managed to create a pattern with the
maximum score in the dataset. The cause of female participants choosing less secure
patterns might be biased by the number of male participants with a background in IT
and Security or that there are more male participants in the dataset. As far as this
research is familiar with, no other research has been found focusing on the selection of
102
passwords based on gender. One research group was investigating the security of the
PassFace scheme where it was observed that users tended to choose faces that they
liked or could compare themselves to [11]. By knowing the gender, they managed to
perform a dictionary attack to guess user selected passwords. If the gender of the user
was known as male, then 10% of the passwords could easily be guessed on the first or
second attempt.
6.3 Handedness and Choice of Graphical Passwords
Handedness is a biological characteristic that relates to how people interact with
physical objects. In general, the majority of the population have the property of being
right-handed while only 12% of the population are left-handed. The results do not
show any significant results indicating any differences in length and visual complexity
for patterns created by left- and right-handed respondents. Thus, there is no statistical
evidence for graphical passwords being influenced by the handedness of the creator.
When selecting handedness as a human property in this study, it was believed that
handedness and the way that respondents interacted with the touch screen would
impact the selection of starting node. Based on the result, two main ways of interacting
with a touch screen for unlocking a smartphone were observed. The first, and most
common way, is to use one hand for holding and interacting with the phone. The
other way is using one hand for holding the phone while using the forefinger on the
other hand for interacting with the screen. 85% and 53% of the right- and left-handed
respondents, respectively, used the two described methods for interaction. The results
confirm that left-handed respondents do not have a main way of interacting with a
smartphone as for right-handed respondents. An explanation for the difference in the
physical behavior could be a historical impact where left-handed children were forced
to write with their right hand.
44% of the respondents started their patterns in the upper left corner, wheras 73% of
the patterns either started in the the upper left corner, upper right corner or the bottom
left corner. Because of the biased selection of starting node, and the different ways of
interacting with the touch screen, it was believed that there would be a difference in the
selection of starting node by looking at handedness. Since the majority of respondents
was right-handed, it was assumed that this was the factor causing the high frequency
of patterns starting in the upper left corner. Therefore, a higher frequency of patterns
starting in the upper right corner as a cause of handedness and physical interaction
was expected when regarding left-handed respondents. However, the results revealed
the opposite, where the majority of the patterns started on the left side of the grid.
The majority of the left-handed respondents would rather start on the left side than
the right side as originally assumed.
An explanation for the unexpected behavior is that right-handed and left-handed
respondents prefer to start the patterns at the same nodes. The cause of the same
behavior need to be looked further into, but studies exploring how memory retrieval
and storage works can be a good start. Researchers have found that people prefer to
scan information and store information in the short memory in a better way when
scanning according to preferred reading and writing direction [10]. As a result of the
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way we scan information, it may cause users to start creating the patterns in the same
way we read and write to be able to remember the patterns we create. The results do
not imply that handedness have any impact on the way we create out patterns, rather
a stronger indication that reading and writing orientation have a stronger impact on
the way we create our patterns. In this study, less than 2% of the population had a
different reading and writing orientation than the majority, e.g. left-to-right. Thus, it
is not possible to use the collected data to make any conclusions about the impact on
the choice of patterns based on the reading and writing orientation.
6.4 Experience with IT and Security and Choice of
Graphical Passwords
The result in this research shows that there is a significant difference in the patterns
created by experienced and inexperienced respondents. There is a significant difference
in the length of patterns created for banking accounts, as well as a significant difference
in the visual complexity for all pattern types.
If a person acknowledges that they have experience with IT and security, it is likely
that they know the risks of selecting short passwords with low complexity that are
easily guessed. The results indicated that the respondents with experience with IT and
security are better with creating patterns, but there is still a low average complexity
score and a high frequency of patterns created with the minimum length. Not a single
respondent created a pattern with the highest complexity score for smartphones; the
patterns created for smartphones were the patterns with the lowest average complexity
score and length, regardless of the IT experience of the creator.
The results shows that even experienced respondents do not create strong patterns.
This study does not know why experienced respondents create short passwords when
they probably know the consequence. One explanation is that users in general are not
able to create and remember long and complex patterns.
6.5 Reading and Writing Orientation and Choice in
Graphical Passwords
As stated, the number of participants with a different reading and writing orientation
than from left-to-right were too low, and thus cannot be used for making any conclusions.
When looking at choice in graphical passwords and handedness, it was observed that
there was no significant difference in the patterns created by left- and right-handed
respondents. This observation gave a stronger indication of reading and writing
orientation having an impact on the choice of graphical password. The reading and
writing direction is proposed for future reasearch.
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6.6 Hand Size and Choice in Graphical Passwords
The data collected for the hand size were not used as a cause of being difficult to
correctly verify the selected hand size. From the start, the property was known to
have a subjective form, meaning that there was a risk of this happening. It is not
known how the collection of hand size could be done differently, as this study selected
the best-known approach. If wanting to look further into the choice of patterns and
the size of the hand, it is probably a better idea to set up an experiment for being
able to correctly measure the size.
6.7 Similarities in the Choice of Graphical Passwords
in the Entire Population
This section looks at the results found when looking at the entire population.
6.7.1 Pattern Creation Time and Length
The average pattern length for the entire population varied according to the pattern
type. Patterns created for banking accounts had the highest average length of 5.92
while the patterns created for smartphones had the lowest average length of 5.40.
Research have reported that the average length of patterns created for smartphones is
5.63 [39], which is close to the average length for smartphones observed in this study.
There are a different number of combinations of patterns with different length, but
patterns of length eight seem to occur less often. For all pattern types, the probability
of a pattern of length 8 to be selected is only 4-5%. The cause of patterns with
length 8 occurring less often then than patterns having a length of 7 or 9 nodes is
not found. Patterns having a long length do not occur at the same frequency as the
short patterns, but the patterns of length 8 are almost absent in some cases. There
are 140.000 patterns of length eight, making the probability of selecting a password of
length 8 high given a uniform selection. From a security perspective, this can reduce
the number of combinations with roughly 140.000 combinations because of the low
probability of users creating a pattern of length eight. Any reduction in the number of
likely combinations is a violation of the security of the password scheme.
Pattern creation time can tell a lot about the validity of the dataset. Respondents
experienced with the Android Unlock Pattern had different reaction time when creating
the patterns for a smartphone. The time used for creating patterns for a shopping
account and bank account was about the same. The difference in creation time between
respondents experienced and inexperienced with ALP was 1.2 seconds. The different
reaction time can be a result of many respondents having shared their actual lock
pattern, or an another pattern known to the respondent. This result indicates that
the dataset possessed includes patterns representative for patterns used in "the wild".
As the result shows, people creates on average short patterns, especially short patterns
are observed created for smartphones. From a security perspective, a smartphone could
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cause loss of huge amounts of sensitive information compared to a shopping account.
As reported by researchers, getting access to a smartphone automatically logged into
an email account can give access to sensitive information like SSN, Bank Account
Number, Email Password and Home Address [16] Selecting short patterns can be seen
as a form of bad risk assessment because it is a risk the possibility of losing sensitive
information. The cause low priority of a secure password mechanism on mobile devices
may be influenced by the trade-off between security and usability. Many users do not
want to spend more time than needed for typing a password. Because of the rapid
use of our mobile device, it makes users spend a lot of the when interacting with the
phone to unlocking the screen. Research have reported that an average user will use
about 2.9% of the spend on interacting with their mobile phone to gaining access by
unlocking the screen [20].
The average pattern length, regardless of pattern type, seems to be low. One factor
might be that the respondents had to retype the pattern they selected, indicating that
people are not capable of remembering longer and more complex patterns. To be able
to remember a password, regular use are required for permanently store the password
in long-term memory. A pattern created for one-time use are stored in short-term
memory, making it hard to recall a complex pattern just created due to how our
short-term memory works [12].
6.7.2 Visual Complexity
On average, the patterns collected for all pattern types were given a low complexity
score. In the entire population, none of the participants managed to produce a pattern
receiving the maximum complexity score of 46.8. The patterns receiving the highest
average complexity score was patterns created for banking applications while patterns
created for smartphones received the lowest complexity score.
Graphical passwords, especially the Android Pattern Lock, need to have their security
evaluated on an extra dimension because of their graphical characteristics. Pattern
locks can, for example, be easily captured by someone, accidentally or intentionally,
by looking over someone’s shoulder. Typing a long pattern will not help when the
visual complexity is low. The length will help in terms of possible combinations, but
will not necessarily avoid the possibility of someone capturing the pattern if the visual
complexity is low. For avoiding such capturing attacks, there is a variety of new
schemes purposed for avoiding such capturing attacks [49, 3].
Overlaps and intersections are some of the parameters used when evaluating the visual
complexity of a pattern. Only 46 overlaps are registered in the dataset. The total
number of patterns including overlaps may be lower because one pattern can have more
than one overlap. One explanation for users not utilizing overlaps in their patterns is
because it might not be very intuitive as a result of how Android explains how the
scheme works. One rule commonly known is the rule of a node only being able to be
selected one time. This rule does not make an overlap very intuitive to select because
the pattern needs to go through an already selected node. The supported feature for
creating overlaps should have been communicated to the users in a better way. The
use of overlaps can assist users to create more visually complex and secure patterns.
The average number of intersections are also low compared to the number of possible
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intersections in a pattern [34]. When looking at all patterns collected, the patterns in
the dataset had an average of only 0.27 intersections.
The observation of the low frequency of intersections and overlaps can be an indication
of people finding it hard to remember visually complex patterns. This result can be
used to reduce the likely password space because there is a low probability that people
would create a pattern containing many intersections or any overlaps at all. This
observation can be seen as a violation of the security of the password scheme because
the number of possible combinations can be reduced.
6.7.3 Association Elements
A unique aspect of graphical patterns is that they are visual and not just text or
numbers with a semantic representation as in PIN codes and alphanumeric passwords.
When creating a password, it is common to create a password that is associated with
something you know to be able to remember and recall the password. In the dataset,
11.4% of the collected patterns corresponded to a letter. The behavior of selecting
Android Pattern Locks corresponding to association elements were also recognized
in another user study [34]. When looking at user-selected passwords, studies show
that many users make use of graphical shapes, or objects, to support the process of
remembering [45].
In this project, only letters were considered as an association element. Other studies
have found that users also uses numbers to form a pattern, indicating that there
might be other association elements than letters used as association elements. An
another research reordered the nodes in the Android Pattern scheme, whereas one of
the rearrangements ended up having the same shape as a Delta [39]. The participants
recognized the element, making the majority of the participants creating a pattern
corresponding to a Delta.
Whether some of the patterns are used as an association element, or just looking like
one as a coincidence, is not possible to know. To be able to answer such question,
a qualitative study are recommended to be able to ask people about their password
selection strategy and whether the use of association elements are a used.
6.7.4 Selection of Starting Node and Movement Patterns
One restriction of the Android Pattern Lock is that each node can only be selected
once, making the selection of starting node crucial in terms of being able to guess
a pattern. The result of this study shows an indication of bias towards the choice
of starting node, whereas 44% of the respondents started creating their patterns in
the upper left corner. The second and third most common starting point was the
upper-right corner and the bottom-left corner, which was selected as a starting node
15% and 14% of the time, respectively. The top three starting nodes thus constitutes
73% of all patterns in the dataset. Given a uniform distribution, the probability of
starting in any node should be 11%, and the total probability of starting in the top
three starting nodes would then be 33%. The results show that users do not select
their patterns uniformly.
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The predictable behavior when selecting the starting node corresponds to the results
from another user study having the same amount of patterns starting in the upper-left
corner [39]. The study also reported having 73% of all patterns starting in either the
upper-left corner, upper-right corner or bottom-left corner, matching the observations
in this study.
The results do not only reveal that patterns are likely to start in the upper-left noder,
patterns also include predictable movement sequences. Most of the patterns are straight
lines close to the edges, whereas the subsequence 123 and 147 often occurs. It does not
only often occur as a subsequence, but it is also one of the most commonly used ways of
starting a pattern. This study reveals that 42% of the created patterns are being found
in the top 100 list of most frequently created patterns. In other words, by selecting
a pattern from the top 100 list, there is a 42% chance of a match. In the same list,
the subsequences 123 and 147 are subsequence appearing most commonly. There is
not found a specific explanation for this behaviour, but it occurs that the respondents
preferred creating patterns close to the edges. Since there is a low frequency of patterns
having intersections and overlaps, an explanation can probably be found by studying
Gestalt and cognitive psychology. The study of psychology is outside the scope of this
research, but the results strongly indicate that user-selected password are being biased
as a cause of the visual appearance of the graphical scheme. The visual appearance is
might causing users to select lines close to the edge as well as starting patterns in the
corners.
6.8 Choice in Graphical Passwords and Context of
Use
When looking at the selection of pattern it seems like the participants have performed
a type of risk assessment. The patterns created do not appear to be created by chance
because there is a difference in both average pattern length, creation time, and visual
complexity for each pattern types.
Sun et al. [34] investigated the effect of using password meters for Android Lock
Patterns to observe if it would assist users in creating stronger patterns. The result
showed that the strength of the created patterns when using pattern meters resulted in
higher complexity and strength, but also introduced a higher error rate when retyping
the pattern. As seen in the result, the patterns created for smartphones have a lower
length and complexity. Engelman et al. [16] reported that 33% of the smartphone
users were thinking about the locking mechanisms as too much of a hassle. Since
higher complexity often can introduce a higher overhead in time used for unlocking
the smartphone, it might be easier for users to select a pattern that are less complex
to retype and remember.
Money is something all respondents are familiar with and understand the consequence
of losing. When looking at the patterns created for smartphones, the results from
this study indicated that users are not being aware of the consequences of choosing
weak passwords on mobile devices. The respondents in this study on average selected
short patterns for smartphones, with a low visual complexity. The described behavior
108
might indicate that users do not understand the consequence if someone could easily
guess the password and gain access to the device. A study reported that 26% of the
users did not think that someone would care about the information stored on their
smartphone [16]. Other studies report otherwise, where only gaining access to for
example an email exposed huge amounts of sensitive information [16].
When setting up the survey with the different pattern types, it requires the respondents
to make a risk assessment and prioritize what the most important; usability or security.
Users might create a more complex pattern for a bank account because losing money is
a tangible risk they might be familiar with. A study reported that users are typically
more security conscious when they are aware of the need for such behavior [2]. At
the same time, a study revealed that 48% of the respondents thought that locking
mechanisms were annoying. In the same study, 95% of them agreed or fully agreed
that they liked the idea of their smartphone being secured [20].
6.9 Limitations
One of the limitations by utilizing a survey is that the accuracy and honesty of people’s
responses cannot be verified. The survey was selected for avoiding manual work, as
well as for ethical concerns. When needing to keep respondents anonymous, there is
no better or easier way for performing data collection and at the same time being able
to verify the honesty of the responses.
Another limitation of using an online survey is that it is not possible to have control
of who participates due to ethical concerns. When conducting research, it is often
desired to have a control group to validate the quality of the collected data. To be
able to use a control group one would have to ask people about their real patterns,
which is not desirable for both ethical and security reasons. This experiment will only
be able to see the choice in patterns based on the properties collected from the survey.
Some of the data properties were subjective, meaning that it is hard to verify the
correctness of the data. Som examples are hand size, screen size, and the question
asking whether the respondent have a background in IT and security. The two first
properties were not used further because the quality was too poor, but the experience
of the users was used. There is no way of verifying that the answer is correct because
the respondents are the ones deciding what "having a background in IT and security"
means.
The research looks at the hypothesis to see whether human properties of the user
impacts the choice in graphical passwords. It is important to mention that the result
from this research is not valid for all graphical passwords. This research does not test
for all human properties, making it possible to do further research on the choice of
graphical password including other human properties than the ones contained in this
research.
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7 | Conclusion and FutureWork
Section 7.1 presents the conclusion for the hypothesis ond the research questions.
Section 7.2 proposes ideas for future work based on the results from this research.
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7.1 Conclusion
The hypotheses in this research tests whether users’ choice of graphical passwords is
influenced by the human properties of the user. The hypotheses are the following:
H0: Human properties have no influence on a user’s choice of
graphical passwords
H1: A user’s choice of graphical passwords is influenced by
the human properties of the user
The human properties included in this research are age, gender, handedness, the user’s
experience with IT and security, reading/writing direction and hand size.
Unfortunately, the alternate hypothesis was not possible to either accept or reject
based on the data collected. First, enough human properties was not collected, which
means that the hypothesis may have been too broad for the experiment. To be able
to answer this hypothesis, more data and properties need to be analyzed. Second,
some properties had to be ignored due to poor data quality and challenges with the
population composition.
Even though the hypothesis cannot be accepted or rejected, the results show a significant
difference in patterns created by various user types. A conclusion of the research
questions is enumerated below.
RQ1 - The choice of graphical passwords and age
The results confirm that the respondents under 25 years creates longer and more
complex patterns than people older than 25.
RQ2 - The choice of graphical passwords and gender
There was a significant difference in the patterns created by male and female respon-
dents, where male respondents created longer and more complex patterns.
RQ3 - The choice of graphical passwords and handedness
The results provide no evidence of a correlation between handedness and choice of
graphical passwords. The length and visual complexity of the patterns created by left-
and right-handed respondent were not significantly different.
RQ4 - The choice of graphical passwords and experience with IT and se-
curity
The data shows a significant difference in pattern length and visual complexity between
people with high IT and security experience, and those with little experience. The
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patterns created by experienced respondents were longer and had a higher visual
complexity than the patterns created by inexperienced respondents.
RQ5 - The choice of graphical passwords and reading/writing orientation
The collected data was not sufficient to make any conclusions if choice in graphical
passwords is influenced by reading and writing orientation.
RQ6 - The choice of graphical passwords and size of hand
The collected hand size data could not be used because the size classification could
not be verified. Therefore,no conclusions about hand size and choice of patterns were
made.
RQ7 - The choice of graphical passwords of the entire population
The results show predictable behaviour when looking at the entire population. There
is a bias towards the selection of starting node. In addition, a significant number of
patterns correspond to a letter in the alphabet. The top 100 patterns in the dataset
constituted 42% of the collected patterns, indicating that users select similar patterns.
RQ8 - The choice of graphical passwords and context of use
The results show that there is a difference in patterns created for the various pattern
types. The respondents create longer and visually more complex patterns for banking
accounts. The patterns created for smartphones had the lowest average length as well
as being less visually complex.
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7.2 Future Work
This section provides a list of three suggestions for future research based on the results
in this research.
7.2.1 Reading and Writing Orientation and Choice of Graphi-
cal Passwords
Instead of observing a correspondence between handedness and selection of graphical
password, this study found that handedness have any impact. Since both left- and
right-handed started their patterns on the left side instead of starting at a different
side as first predicted, reading and writing orientation looks even more promising than
previously thought. Unfortunately, this project did not manage to collect enough
data from respondents having an another reading and writing direction than from
left-to-right. Reading and writing orientation looks like a human property having
a potential for giving positive results when looking at people’s choice in graphical
passwords.
7.2.2 The Use of Statistical Attack Models in Forensics
This study started with the far-fetched idea of "tell me who you are and I will tell you
your lock pattern". This idea is difficult to solve in practice. For being able to achieve
the described idea, an attack model needs to be built. Previous research have created
a statistical attack model, also known as a Markov Model, only using the patterns [39].
By applying knowledge of how patterns are created by the different user types, it is
believed that the guessing rate of the model can be improved.
The described model are requested from a security intelligence group in a country
whereas the name need to stay unmentioned. Such attack model can assist security
intelligences in forensic cases, as mobile devices can provide important data for solving
such cases. When needing to catch a criminal, time and information is crucial. Android
Pattern Lock have in particular been reported as a problem where it currently lacked
research. For future research, it is possible to use the results of this research for
building models to predict patterns with a higher success rate than is being possible
today.
7.2.3 Exploring Other Graphical Password Schemes
The Android Lock Pattern are one of the few locking mechanisms available on mobile
devises. When reviewing the literature, there are lacking studies looking at human
properties and choice of graphical passwords. This study looked in particular at the
Android Lock Pattern. It would be interesting to see if the results in this research
were found across different locking mechanisms. Such knowledge can be used to get a
better understanding of how people handle security on mobile devices. How people
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manage security can provide insightful information for building locking mechanism
assisting users to create more secure passwords.
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A | Wireframes of Survey Ap-
plication
(a) Introduction screen (b) Introduction to Android
Lock Pattern
(c) Training mode
(d) Introduction to pattern cre-
ation
(e) Creation of pattern 1 (f) Creation of pattern 2
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(g) Creation of pattern 3 (h) Q1: Hand size (i) Q2: Screen size
(j) Q3: Handedness (k) Q4: Finger used in pattern
creation
(l) Q5: Reading/Writing orien-
tation
(m) Q6: Gender (n) Q7: Age (o) Q8: Nationality
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(p) Q9: Android Unlock Pat-
tern experience
(q) Q10: Screen lock usage (r) Q11: Selected screen lock
(s) Q12: Mobile OS (t) Q13: Experience with IT
and security
(u) Questionnaire completed
Figure A.1: Wireframes
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